Spain: Poverty, Social Exclusion and 'Safety Nets' by Arriba, Ana & Moreno, Luis
 1
Unidad de Políticas Comparadas (CSIC) 
Documento de Trabajo 02-10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Spain: Poverty, Social Exclusion and 
‘Safety Nets’∗ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ana Arriba and Luis Moreno  
 
Arriba@iesam.csci.es 
Lmorfer@iesam.csic.es 
 
 
Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC) 
Unidad de Políticas Comparadas 
 
 
European Project FIPOSC (‘Fighting Poverty and Social Exclusion in Southern 
Europe: Dilemmas of Organization and Implementation’) 
 
 
Programme ‘Improving the Human Research Potential and Socio-economic 
Knowledge Base’, 
Research Directorate General, European Commission, 
HPSE-CT-2001-60020 
 
 
September 2002 
 
                                            
∗ This report is based in previous texts elaborated by both authors: Arriba (1999, 2002), Moreno 
and Arriba (1999); and Moreno (2000a/b, 2001a/b, 2002a/b; & Sarasa, 1993). The authors 
express their gratitude to Teresa Buil for her assistance in data collection and the elaboration of 
appendices, tables and figures. 
 2
1. Introduction 
 
The Spanish welfare state incorporates elements of both Bismarckian and 
Beveridgean traditions, and can be labelled as a via media with respect to other 
regimes of social protection. It combines universal and targeted access to 
services and benefits. The most relevant factor conditioning welfare 
development in Spain is the importance of decentralisation both at the level of 
planning and policy implementation. Decentralisation of social assistance and 
services has had much greater impact than privatisation in the last decades.  
 
After a long hyper-centralist dictatorship (1939-75), a peaceful transition to 
democracy (1975-79), and an active involvement in the process of 
Europeanisation after its accession to the EEC (1986), Spain has undergone 
deep and far-reaching social transformations. In economic terms, Spanish 
development has been outstanding: in 1959 the Spanish GDP per head was 
58.3% of the EU average; in 1985, 70.6% and, by 1998, 81.5%. Spain would 
match the EU mean by the year 2025 if the annual ‘catching-up’ rate of 0.8% 
were maintained. No other country in the group of the advanced industrial 
democracies has achieved a comparable rate of economic growth. However, 
economic problems, high levels of unemployment, a severe demographic 
imbalance and the abrupt decline of the traditional system of domestic care are 
now threatening the stability of the welfare settlement. 
 
As a member of the Mediterranean family of nations, Spain shares with Greece, 
Italy and Portugal1 similarities in historical background, value-systems, and 
institutional characteristics. The four Southern European countries constitute a 
distinct welfare regime alongside the well-researched Anglo-Saxon, Continental 
and Nordic (Sarasa and Moreno, 1995; Ferrera, 1996; Rhodes, 1997). The role 
played by the family in the Mediterranean regime constitutes one of its more 
characteristic traits. Within households, ‘superwomen’2 have in the last decades 
deployed a remarkable hyperactivity, which has been crucial for both social 
cohesion and economic growth of the Mediterranean countries (Moreno, 
2002b). 
 
Of singular importance regarding Mediterranean welfare development are the 
manifestations of its cultural-axiological dimension. This is reflected in a self-
perception of differentiated needs and lifestyles (intra-familial pooling of 
resources, home ownership, and heterogeneity of social reproduction). Also 
noticeable is a compelling household micro-solidarity and a pre-eminence of 
values of family inclusion and life-cycle redistribution (gift mechanisms, 
processes of age emancipation, proliferation of family companies and jobs). 
Moreover, cultural choices and practices have structured their civil societies in a 
characteristic mode (social networking, patronage, clientelism, and group 
                                            
1 Although Portugal does not have a Mediterranean coast, and its formidable overseas 
expansion was historically carried out with an Atlantic mentality, its axiological resources belong 
to a high degree to the Mare Nostrum cultural world. 
2 By ‘superwomen’ we refer to a type of Mediterranean woman who has been able to reconcile 
unpaid caring work in the household and her increasing professional activities in the paid labour 
market. Cohorts of women in the age group 40-59 are, grosso modo, representatives of this 
type of ‘superwoman’. 
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predation). However, common to other EU welfare regimes is the debate in 
Southern Europe concerning the promotion of social inclusion, and the fight 
against poverty and situations of citizens’ precariousness and vulnerability.  
 
Contrary to some views regarding South European countries as a mere ‘Latin 
rim’ extra-profiting of ‘social dumping’ practices, the evidence show that the 
countries of the Mediterranean regime are the only ones which have increased 
their overall social spending during the 1980s and 1990s (see Table 1). Note 
that the difference between the welfare regime with the highest social spending 
in 1984 (Continental) and the average of the Mediterranean countries was 9.4 
per percentage points. This figure was reduced in 1997 to 7.4 between the 
highest spender Nordic regime and the South European countries.  
 
The welfare state in Spain represents today a fundamental structure for both 
social reproduction and political legitimisation (see Table 2). Since its 
integration in the European Community (1986), Spain has followed a pattern of 
welfare convergence with their European counterparts of a three-fold nature. 
Firstly, a generalisation of social entitlements (education, health, pensions). 
Secondly, a confluence in the pattern of welfare expenditure to the mean of its 
European partners. Thirdly, a diversification in the provision of social services 
by private and ‘third sector’ organisations.3  
 
Spain social expenditure has noticeably increased during the 1980s and 1990s. 
This is more evident if we consider that OECD figures do not generally take into 
account social spending of the Spanish regional government, which has 
dramatically increased their share in the total aggregate of Spanish public 
expenditure (see Table 3). Note in this respect that already in 1992 Spain’s total 
social expenditure reached the figure of 22.7% of the GDP (Rodríguez Cabrero, 
1994) 
 
As in other Mediterranean countries, the aggregate of public policies and 
interventions associated to ‘safety nets’ have developed in a fragmented 
manner. Indeed, Spanish welfare state expansion has been quite pronounced 
but it has generally been accomplished inductively on incrementalist bases. As 
a result, benefits and services are targeted on different collectives, which often 
do not have any correlation between them, although they sometimes share the 
same characteristics (Eardley et al, 1996). Note that other functional intervening 
factors, such as intra-familial transfers, community help, or altruistic help 
provided by NGOs (Non-Governmental Organisations) and ‘third sector’ 
associations, have greatly contributed to consolidate ‘safety nets’ although 
much research work is needed in order to systematise evidence in this respect. 
However, it is worth looking at the primary institutions of reference for the poor 
in Spain: more than 50% of all poor in Spain go first to either Caritas or the Red 
Cross in search of support (Table 4). 
 
                                            
3 Note that social services were already a domain for private intervention. The new scenario is 
precisely the building of public networks within which the third sector plays a subsidiary --in 
many cases publicly subsidised-- role.  
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This report analyses developments in Spanish welfare mainly with relation to 
policies dealing with poverty alleviation and programmes combating social 
exclusion. Core areas of observation are the so-called ‘safety nets’ of social 
protection, which have been ‘under construction’ in Spain during the last 15 
years.  
 
‘Safety nets’ aim at providing citizens and families with basic means that 
guarantee the satisfaction of minimum vital needs and facilitate civic integration. 
‘Safety nets’ are bottom-lines of welfare provision and as such they adopt 
institutionalised expressions that vary in degrees and manners (Moreno, 2000b, 
2001b). The complex task for the social scientist is to determine the constituent 
materials by which ‘safety nets’ are interwoven. Public programmes of social 
assistance provided on a means-tested basis are basic constituent elements. In 
many cases these programmes are not a social security responsibility, although 
they may be linked to contributory social services and subsidies.  
 
In the following section of this paper a review of the historical background to the 
development of social policies in Spain is carried out. The evolution of poverty 
alleviation programmes is examined within the broader Spanish welfare state 
framework. A special incidence is made on the creation of regional systems of 
social services and the development of programmes of social assistance by 
both central and regional layers of government. 
 
After analysing the compound nature of the Spanish ‘safety nets’, the third 
section concentrates on the latest developments and initiatives undertaken with 
reference to the 2001-2003 National Action Plan for Social Inclusion (NAPSI, or 
NAP/incl., as expressed in document of the European Commission).  
 
As already pointed out, decentralisation is the single most important variable in 
the development of policies concerning social services and assistance in Spain. 
A greater regional say in areas of policy-making closer to citizens’ perceptions, 
such as the ‘weaving of safety nets’, have often been claimed on cultural or 
identity considerations. But demands on the grounds that policy innovation and 
a more effective management are facilitated by the devolution of powers to 
regions and municipalities have also been put forward. Evidence supporting 
those claims can be tested by the implementation in Spain of minimum income 
schemes (Rentas Mínimas de Inserción).  
 
In the light of the Spanish experience, it is concluded that more attention is to 
be paid on the increasing role of regional and local layers of government. 
These, in concurrence with central institutions of EU institutions and of member 
states, are key actors in order to promote social inclusion of those precarious 
citizens facing poverty or social exclusion.  
 
2. Historical Background 
 
The development of welfare in Spain can only be understood in the context of the 
historical background prior to the transition from Francoism to democracy (1975-
78). The peaceful democratic transition was made possible by the deployment of 
consensual politics among representatives, parties and social actors, who 
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accepted the fact that the reform-process had to take into account the previous 
institutional framework. Thus, the consolidation of Spain’s welfare state had to 
evolve from the institutions and social protection policies developed during 
Franco’s dictatorship (1939-75).  
 
 2.1. 1939-1967: The years of autarchy and the boom of ‘desarrollismo’ 
 
This period was characterised by an attempt to achieve total autarchy with no 
foreign interference. Social policy was largely neglected and oriented towards both 
charity and beneficence. 
 
"Our State must be Catholic in the social", General Franco had already declared in 
1937. The Obra Social was set up in order to "bring joy and bread to the Spanish 
families". The worker was regarded as a unit of economic production and, 
accordingly, was entitled to receive social protection against unexpected risks. In 
turn, he or she should be obedient and diligent. This kind of Catholic paternalism 
had been elaborated by the most reactionary sector of Spanish Catholicism, which 
advocated that income should correspond to social status. 
 
A peculiar aspect incorporated in the Fuero del Trabajo, a constitutional Labour 
Act implemented by Franco's Government in 1938, concerned the social status of 
women. The Francoist State pursued the ‘return’ of women from the factory to the 
household. To this end a family subsidy was introduced within social security to 
encourage women to remain at home "taking care of their husband and children". 
 
The National Institute for Social Provision (Instituto Nacional de Previsión Social) 
was the institution responsible for social insurance. It incorporated gradually and 
in a rather disorderly manner the administration of the various existing benefits 
and subsidies. In 1938, a Family Subsidy (Subsidio Familiar) was established. In 
1942, the programme of Plus Familiar was also created. This subsidy was 
basically a complement to salaries. Unemployment insurance was established 
much later, in 1969, and was directed at the affiliates of the retirement and illness 
insurance schemes. In this indirect way wage restrictions were imposed on the 
beneficiaries (Guillén, 1992). 
 
In 1939, an old-age subsidy was introduced to provide benefits for low-waged 
employees. This turned into the SOVI in 1947 (Seguro Obligatorio de Vejez e 
Invalidez, Compulsory Insurance for Retirement and Invalidity). In 1942, the 
Statutory Sickness Insurance was also implemented (SOE, Seguro Obligatorio de 
Enfermedad). Its duration was limited in time regardless of the health condition of 
the claimant, and its implicit aim was to ‘encourage’ the employee to go back to 
work as soon as possible.4 
 
Along with the compulsory social insurance, the old system of mutual insurance 
was restored. This latter system was meant to be complementary to the former. 
                                            
4 Health services were delivered by both public and private institutions in agreement with the social 
security system. This latter arrangement secured the incomes of medical doctors, who in most 
cases also worked in the private sector. The pharmaceutical industry profited abundantly as well. In 
turn, the quality of the public health service was very poor (Moreno and Sarasa, 1993). 
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But both systems developed in an overlapping and duplicating manner . Labour 
mutualidades (mutual aid associations) were non-profit making associations, 
organised according to occupational and territorial criteria. They were financed by 
payroll taxes and developed according to a system of capitalisation. Their benefits 
were allocated to their members according to an income maintenance criterion. 
 
Public intervention other than the labour population was paternalistic and provided 
along charity lines. Social services were very residual in the public sphere and 
were integrated in the local administration (mainly provincial administrations, or 
Diputaciones), and within the Home Ministry at the central level of government. 
Benefits were distributed by a Fund of Social-Charitable Protection (Fondo de 
Protección Benéfico-Social), which had a share of profits accrued by public lotto 
and games, and which also received private donations. Help and assistance to 
beneficiaries were provided in a rather discretionary manner in situations of visible 
need.  
 
Given the scarce public intervention in programmes for poverty alleviation, 
subsidiary action was carried out by private organisations, mainly associated to 
the RC Church, and by foundations such as those of the Red Cross and some 
quasi-public Saving Banks (obras sociales de las Cajas de Ahorro). The fascist 
Falange, the only legal party in Franco’s dictatorship, also developed an institution 
for social assistance (Obra de Auxilio Social). This was an authoritarian, para-
state body, which was based upon the voluntary work (in many cases forced by a 
compulsory social service for women, along the lines of military conscription for 
men) 
 
The period of economic ‘desarrollismo’ (developmentalism) started with the 
implementation of the Stabilisation Plan of 1959, which marked the turning point 
for the progressive liberalisation of the Spanish economy. Technocrats of the 
Opus Dei held the key posts in Franco's government and imported models of 
‘indicative planning’ from France.5 Some steps were taken to implement a system 
of labour regulation that moderated somewhat its dirigiste nature. In 1958, for 
example, a Collective Agreements Act allowed employers and employees to 
negotiate wages (which had previously been regulated by the Ministry of Labour) 
at the factory level. In 1963 the Minimum Wage (Salario Mínimo Interprofesional) 
was legally established. Note that full employment was practically achieved at the 
cost of the emigration of a great proportion of the Spanish workers to central 
European countries.  
 
In 1960, several funds for financing assistance were legally established, such as 
the National Fund for Social Assistance (Fondo Nacional de Asistencia Social, 
FONAS). This Fund had the aim of supporting charity institutions and of 
distributing subventions to develop some social services. In the late 1960s, the RC 
Church reinforced its subsidiary role according to the doctrine of Social 
Catholicism. This was evident in those activities of Caritas which pursued a more 
                                            
5 With the implementation of the 1959 Stabilisation Plan public expenditure was reduced, the 
Peseta was devalued, and investment controls were relaxed. Foreign holdings of up to 50% in 
Spanish companies were permitted. The results of the desarrollismo were impressive, with GDP 
growing by an annual 7% between 1960 and 1974. 
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comprehensive course of action away from those traditional charities of mere relief 
to the needy. 
 
In 1963, the Basic Law of the Social Security (Ley de Bases de la Seguridad 
Social) was put into effect. It had a universalistic vocation and went hand in hand 
with a timid fiscal reform. A peculiar model of economic development - 
vocationally neo-Keynesian but constrained by the rigidities of an authoritarian 
regime - attempted the transition from an agrarian society to a fully industrialised 
polity with some degree of success, modifying in this process the occupational 
structure of the country.  
 
Social expenditure grew significantly during the 1960s: from a 35.5% in 1960 to 
55.9% in 1970 of the total public spending. Note, however, that the increase was a 
meagre 3 percentage point of the GDP. Social assistance continued to play a 
secondary role in the system of social protection and income maintenance 
contributory programmes were the main priority in reforms which extended 
coverage to affiliated employees of the Social Security.  
 
In sum, after the 1959 Stabilisation Plan, and in the absence of an entrepreneurial 
class, Franco’s technocrats from the state institutions promoted a process of 
economic modernisation. However, public intervention was mainly geared at 
avoided social unrest by means of combining both paternalism and repression 
(Rodríguez Cabrero, 1989). 
 
 2.2. 1968-78: Late Francoism and the transition to democracy 
 
The opposition movement against Francoism became very active in the late 
1960s and early 1970s. These were years of political and social turmoil that 
constituted the prelude to the transition to democracy after the death of Franco in 
November 1975. In 1969, don Juan Carlos had been appointed future head of 
state and, in 1970, a preferential treaty had been signed between Spain and the 
European Economic Community (EEC). 
 
In 1972 reform of the Social Security, the Financing and Improvement Law (Ley 
de  Financiación y Perfeccionamiento) was implemented with the aim of 
expanding social protection, especially concerning temporary labour incapacity, 
unemployment and old-age pensions. The linkage of workers’ contributions to real 
incomes allowed for a significant increase of benefits in the contributory system. 
New special regimes of the Social Security (up to 20) were created and increased 
the fragmentation of the contributory system. Unequal social contributions and 
payroll taxes paid to the social security system favoured middle classes and large 
companies. Despite some improvements in the level of protection, these reforms 
underlined the negative level of internal equalisation within the contributory system 
(Cruz Roche, Desdentado and Rodríguez Cabrero, 1985). 
 
With the implementation of the General Education Law (Ley General de 
Educación) in 1970 and the General Law of social security Law (Ley General de la 
Seguridad Social) in 1974, the level of public spending rose very significantly. 
Considerable wage increases also took place between 1974 and 1976. These 
factors set the basis for the subsequent climate of social consensus that 
 8
contributed to making the peaceful transition to democracy possible. The main 
bulk of social spending since the 1970s was devoted to retirement pensions and 
unemployment benefits.  
 
At the end of the Francoist period in Spain, social assistance was characterised 
by a scarce public financing, a limited degree of social protection, and the 
important role played by some private or non-profit making institutions. The 
small supply of social services was provided by a variety of both public bodies 
and private institutions.  
 
In 1977, the General Directorate for Social Action and Social Services was 
established within the Ministry of Health and Social Security. This governmental 
body took over those responsibilities of social assistance which had been 
previously attached to various departments of the central government (Home 
Ministry, principally). It run programmes such as those related to the Social 
Assistance Fund (Fondo de Asistencia Social), whose non-contributory benefits 
covered old-age and disability pensions. This was considered to be the principal 
instrument of social assistance at that time.  
 
Within the contributory system of the social security, there were services for 
gainfully employees and their dependent family members. The social security 
system was re-structured with the grouping of old-age and disabled services 
into the Institute for Social Services (INSERSO-Instituto de Servicios Sociales), 
a quasi-autonomous public agency of the social security within the framework of 
the Ministry of Labour. 
 
In parallel, local authorities (municipalities and provincial authorities) continued 
to run various programmes of social assistance, which were in many cases the 
inheritors of traditional public charities and beneficence. Private institutions also 
continued to provide charitable donations and some services, particularly those 
offered by RC Church organisations. 
 
In the period of transition to democracy, renewed citizens’ demands for the 
implementation of new social services were coupled with an active mobilisation 
of the social workers in order to develop a new framework of service provision 
(Sarasa, 1993; Casado et al., 1994). 
 
Outside the contributory realm, Francoism left a very meagre system of social 
assistance, reduced coverage of unemployment, absence of welfare cash 
benefits, insufficient social services with a high degree of institutional dispersion, a 
prevalence of beneficence criteria and approaches, and a paramount concern 
towards keeping the social order. Both the RC Church, benefiting from large state 
subsidies, and the family (namely women’s caring activities), played a crucial 
subsidiary role during Francoism (Arriba, 1999). 
  
 2.3. 1978-1987: The establishment of the regional systems of social 
services 
 
An historical review of the reforms implemented in Spain since the inception of 
the democratic Constitution of 1978 has to acknowledge the fragmented and 
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inductive nature of the reforms implemented during the transition to democracy. 
The 1978 Constitution inaugurated the period of institutionalisation of the social 
services in Spain and the activities within the social assistance realm. 
 
According to the Spanish Carta Magna, social assistance is a regional power of 
the ‘exclusive competence’ of the 17 Autonomous Communities (art. 148; 1.20). 
Powers concerning the basic legislation and the economic regime of the social 
security system remained within the domain of the central government. 
However, the Comunidades Autónomas (Autonomous Communities) could 
exercise executive powers in the running and managing of contributory 
programmes which could be decentralised to them (art. 149; 1.17). 
 
The constitutional provisions neither defined nor regulated the non-contributory 
realm of social assistance and social services. Furthermore, all those powers 
and responsibilities which were not listed as ‘exclusive competence’ of the 
central government could be claimed and exercised by the Autonomous 
Communities (art 149.3). 
 
As a consequence of the flexibility of the constitutional provisions, all 
Autonomous Communities claimed in their Statutes of Autonomy (regional 
constitutional laws) a large number of services and functions concerning social 
assistance, social services, community development, social promotion and 
welfare policies in general. The only services, which remained outside the 
request of the mesogovernments, were those of the INSERSO. However, and 
as we will analysed below, during the 1990s the executive powers for the 
running of practically all INSERSO social services have also been transferred to 
the Comunidades Autónomas. 
 
During the period 1982-1993, the Autonomous Communities took the legislative 
initiative in their regional parliaments, and passed acts which established 
regional systems of social services. In these pieces of legislation there were no 
references to social assistance as such. The implicit assumption was that, 
according to a comprehensive interpretation, social assistance was an 
‘exclusive’ power of the Autonomous Communities, alongside with the social 
services. In this period the main concern for the Spanish mesogovernments 
was to request and receive as many powers from the central administration as a 
flexible interpretation of the 1978 Constitution could allow. The Comunidades 
Autónomas subsequently  made extensive use of their constitutional prerogative 
for purposes of institutional legitimisation. 
 
In order to develop an integrated network of social services, a common claim in 
the legislation adopted by the regional parliaments was the principle of 
decentralisation. According to this, local governments would carry out the bulk 
of service provision,6 but the powers of legislation, planning, and co-ordination 
with the private and altruistic sectors would rest upon regional executives and 
legislatures. 
                                            
6 Responsibilities in the provision of social services for municipalities of more than 20,000 
inhabitants had already been established by the Basic Law for Local Government passed by the 
Spanish Parliament in 1982.  
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All regional laws envisaged the social services as an integrated public system, 
open to all citizens without discrimination. Universal access and equal treatment 
were, thus, the two ideological foundations of the regional legislation on welfare 
provision. Traditional public beneficence was to be ‘updated’ so that 
stigmatisation of beneficiaries could be avoided. All things considered, the aim 
was one of modernisation of the social services in line with other experiences of 
welfare provision in Western Europe. Such aspirations were to be in tune with 
the aim of rationalising the provision of new services. To this end inputs of a 
comprehensive, equal and public nature put forward by a new generation of 
trained social workers were very important.  
 
The idea of the welfare ‘mix’ was also embraced enthusiastically by most 
Spanish mesogovernments so that social intervention could be optimised. Non-
profit organisations, in particular, were incorporated in the general provision of 
social services, and many of them were subsidised by the regional public 
bodies.  
 
The processes for the implementation of regional systems of social services in 
Spain were not developed without a degree of friction with the central 
government. In 1986, a decision of the Constitutional Court (146/1986) 
established that, despite the ‘exclusive’ powers of the Autonomous 
Communities in this field, the central government could also develop 
programmes of social assistance guaranteeing an equal treatment to all 
Comunidades Autónomas.  
 
Among the initiatives taken by the central government during this period, the 
passing of the LISMI Law (1982) is to be underlined. This piece of legislation 
provided guaranteed benefits to citizens with disability (65% or higher). In the 
years 1983-84, the Socialist Government also attempted unsuccessfully to 
enact a National Act of Social Services. This Law would aim at integrating all 
‘scattered’ social services within the contributory system of the social security 
into one institutional framework, centrally managed. But the Spanish 
mesogovernments remained as the main protagonists in the area of welfare 
development, a logical consequence of the home-rule-all-round process of 
decentralisation (Casado et al., 1994).  
 
 2.4. 1988-2000: The expansion and consolidation of welfare 
programmes 
 
The year 1988 can be identified as the beginning of a cycle of major 
developments concerning social services in Spain, and of a big expansion of 
social spending. The establishment in 1988 of the Ministry of Social Affairs7 
aimed at the development of a social policy, and area of public intervention 
which had been ‘hidden’ within the organisational structure of the Ministry of 
                                            
7 The Ministry was formed by the General Directorate of Social Action, the INSERSO, and the 
Institutes for the Women and the Youth, and the Board for the Education and Care of the 
Disabled. It took also the responsibility of supervising the activities of NGOs, such as the Red 
Cross, the Blinds’ Organisation, and other non-profit private charities.  
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Labour. However, central intervention was somewhat conditioned by the 
consolidation of the regional systems promoted by the Spanish Comunidades 
Autónomas. Some views were expressed against the establishment of a 
Ministry which would lack of many powers already decentralised to the 
mesogovernments (Beltrán, 1992).  
 
But the newly created Ministry of Social Affairs pursued a course of action of co-
ordination with the mesogovernments in the development of General Plans 
such as those concerning Old-age, Drug Addiction, Equal Opportunities, or 
Youth. These Plans were not passed as pieces of legislation by the Spanish 
Parliament. They were agreements aiming at making functional the structures of 
welfare provision in the whole of Spain. In particular, they paved the way for the 
future transfer of the social services of the INSERSO to the regional systems of 
social services. 
 
The most important agreement between the three layers of governments had 
already taken place in 1987 with the approval of the ‘Concerted Plan for the 
Development of the Basic Provision of Social Services by the Local Authorities’ 
(Plan Concertado para el Desarrollo de Prestaciones Básicas de Servicios 
Sociales de las Corporaciones Locales). This intergovernmental agreement has 
resulted in an administrative co-operation between central, regional and local 
governments. The aim is that of providing services at the municipal level for the 
following purposes: (a) information and counselling; (b) social and day care 
services for the disabled and elderly; (c) refuge for abused women, single 
mothers, orphans or mistreated minors, and shelter housing for the homeless; 
and (d) prevention and social insertion.  
 
This network of centres constitutes the basic level for primary attention in Spain, 
and was supported by all Autonomous Communities except the Basque 
Country.8 The annual financing of this Plan is met on equitable terms by the 
three layers of governments. This agreement was the first in a model of 
intergovernmental relations characteristic of the process of federalisation of 
politics in Spain. Its implications for other policy areas have been of no little 
significance (Agranoff, 1993; Moreno, 2001c). 
 
Also in 1987, Spain had joined the EEC II Programme of Fight Against Poverty. 
This involvement enabled the collaboration of various private and public 
institutions at the different level of government. Comparisons with the situation 
in other European countries were drawn. As a result, a growing concern on 
poverty was noticeable at the various institutional levels and cognitive domains 
(intervention and research).  
 
During this period the major reform carried out by the central government 
concerning low-income citizens was the universalisation of old-age and 
disability pensions. These pensions have become a fundamental component in 
the weaving of the Spanish ‘safety net’. In 1990, the Law of Non-Contributory 
Pensions of the Social Security (26/1990) put into effect the awarding of means-
                                            
8 The Basque government did not join this general agreement because it did not accept 
categorical financing. 
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tested benefits for old-age and disabled citizens outside the social security 
system. The 26/1990 Law also established the awarding of means-tested 
benefits to low-income families for children under 18 years and handicapped 
(see Table 9), and to which both families in the contributory and non-
contributory systems were entitled to claim. 
 
The most relevant developments regarding assistance and non-contributory 
benefits were implemented during this period. All things considered, the single 
most innovative contribution in the construction of ‘safety nets’ in Spain has 
been made possible by the process of decentralisation of power to the 17 
Comunidades Autónomas. These have developed an active role regarding the 
implementation of policies directed to fight poverty and social exclusion. Let us 
remind that the executive responsibilities for the running of the INSERSO 
services were also handed over to the Autonomous Communities.  
 
In parallel, and mostly during the 1990s, the regions decided to implement their 
programmes of minimum income for insertion (Rentas Mínimas de Inserción). 
These are programmes of minimum income guaranteed for low-income families, 
which aim at facilitating social insertion of the recipient families (along the lines 
of the early principles established by the French RMI). These minimum income 
benefits filled in a hole in the social protection system or, in other words, helped 
to complete the ‘weaving’ of the Spanish ‘safety net’ as it stands now. Such 
benefits were intended to provide monetary resources to those citizens 
potentially active in the labour market confronting situations of need. 
Elaboration and implementation of  these programmes by the Spanish regions 
took place between 1989 (first programme introduced in the Basque Country) 
and 1995 (last one implemented in the Balearic Islands). In chapter 4 main 
features of these programmes will be analysed. Let us point out now that, 
despite their common initial purposes, they are diverse as regards protection 
intensity, coverage or means to achieve social integration of programme 
beneficiaries.  
 
This period of expansion for social assistance and services took place precisely 
when the Ministry of Social Affairs was subsumed in the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Affairs after the victory of the Popular Party in the 1996 General 
Elections. The former Ministry’s powers and competencies were integrated in 
the lower ranked Secretaría General de Asuntos Sociales. Also in 1996 the 
INSERSO changed its name with the assumption of competencies concerning 
migration. It was renamed as IMSERSO (Instituto de Migraciones y Servicios 
Sociales – Institute for Migration and Social Services). Since then, it has kept 
minor executive programmes regarding services for emigrants, as well as some 
functions of co-ordination with EU programmes. 
 
The considerable expansion of both regional social services and social 
assistance programmes has resulted in a de iure segmentation between the 
contributory (social insurance system for ‘insiders’ and gainfully employees) and 
social assistance realms of welfare provision (for those excluded from the 
formal labour market). However, both domains are intertwined in an aggregate 
of social provision. This has been inspired by the general principle of social 
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citizenship and has, thus, expanded the ‘grey zones’ between both social 
insurance and welfare assistance realms (Moreno and Sarasa, 1993). 
 
Note that in the period 1980-92, the total number of pensioners rose by 2,5 
million (2,1, contributory, and 0,4, non-contributory), from 4,7 to 7,2 million. The 
total expenditure increased from 5.9% (5.8%, contributory, and 0.1%, non-
contributory) to 8.6% (8.1 contributory, and 0.5 non-contributory) as a 
percentage of the Spanish GDP. Average social security pension benefits 
increased from 66.5% of the minimum salary, in 1980, to 93.3% in 1992, and 
100%, in 1995. Non-contributory pensions amounted to 53.3% of the legal 
minimum salary in 1992 (Cruz Roche, 1994).9  
 
After this period of expansion reforms have concentrated in the consolidation of 
the general system of social protection, especially as concerns financing. This 
course of action has been based on the consent of the main parliamentary 
parties and social agents (trade unions, principally). The Report on the 
‘Proposal for the Analysis of the Structural Problems of the Social Security 
System and of the Main Reforms to be Accomplished’ (Ponencia para el 
Análisis de los Problemas Estructurales del Sistema de la Seguridad Social y 
de las Principales Reformas que deberán acometerse) was approved by the 
Congress of Deputies (Spanish parliamentary Lower House) on April 6, 1995, 
and has since then been known as the Pacto de Toledo.10 Among the main 
objectives pursued two can be underlined:  
 
(1) A clear division between contributory social insurance and universal non-
contributory benefits. This implies that benefits and services of a universal 
nature (health and social services), and assistance subsidies (pensions’ 
supplements, non-contributory pensions and cash benefits for dependent 
children) are to be financed by transfers from general taxation revenue. 
Contributory benefits, in turn, are to be met by both employers and employees. 
 
(2) Pensions (contributory and non-contributory) are to be up-rated annually in 
line with price increases (and retroactively).  
 
Another main line of reforms has been the gradual orientation towards the 
activation of policies targeted on claimants potentially active in the labour 
market. This has been coupled with the adoption of a somewhat restrictive 
criterion towards access to benefits and unemployment subsidies. Access to the 
                                            
9 However the minimum salary decreased from 77.5% of the per capita GDP, in 1980, to 52.4%, 
in 1992. 
10 Following its parliamentary approval, on October 9, 1996 the main Trade Unions (CCOO and 
UGT) and the Government signed the ‘Agreement for the Consolidation and Rationalization of 
the Social Security System’ (Acuerdo Consolidación y Racionalización del Sistema de 
Seguridad Social). The Law 24/1997 on ‘Consolidation and Rationalization of the Social 
Security (Ley de Consolidación y Racionalización de la Seguridad Social) was based on the 
previous ‘Proposal’ and ‘Agreement’. The Trade Unions had given their consent until 2000. In 
April 2001 a new ‘Agreement for the Improvement and Development of the System of Social 
Protection’ was signed among Government, Employers’ Associations (CEOE and CEPYME), 
and CCOO. The other main Trade Union, UGT, disagreed with some of the contents of the text 
and refused to sign.  
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latter has been restricted even further regarding previous contributory 
requirements and benefit duration.11 Insertion goals included in the regional 
programmes of minimum income have been the most visible orientation of this 
activation approach. However, this workfare development has also extended to 
unemployment subsidies (e.g. active income for insertion, requirements for both 
agrarian unemployment and general unemployment subsidies, or schemes for 
‘flexible’ retirement). Furthermore, programmes targeted to favour access to the 
labour market are also taking into account incentives for workfare activation of 
those sectors of population socially excluded.12 This approach is meant to 
optimise both policies of labour activation by employment services and those 
carried by social services for purposes of social insertion.  
 
Some policies for a limited family support have been also implemented in recent 
years. An instance of this is the Individual and Family Minimum benefit (Mínimo 
Personal y Familiar) according to the 1998 Income Tax Act (40/98). This 
Mínimo was defined as the disposable income of the taxpayer to comply with 
his/her basic needs and with those of his/her dependent family members (see 
Table 7). Mínimo amounts are not only tax deductible, but differences up to the 
annually established minimum threshold can be claimed by the taxpayers from 
the Spanish central treasury.13 Other measures have been aimed at facilitating 
conciliation between family and labour lives (Ley por la Conciliación de la Vida 
Laboral y Familiar, 39/1999), and some of them implicitly favouring a pro-
natalist policy.14 According to Decree-Law (1/2000) the already low benefits for 
family protection were slightly increased.15 Likewise, new cash benefits were to 
be awarded for the birth of a third and successive child, as well as in the case of 
multiple births (they are small one-off payments as reproduced in Table 9). 
 
The process of decentralisation of policies and services has been deepened 
and reinforced in recent times. However, the principle of decentralisation put 
forward by the regional legislation has often brought about a certain re-
centralisation of the policy-making process on the intermediate layer of 
                                            
11 In April 2002, the Government made public its proposals to reform unemployment provisions, 
which have been highly contested by the trade unions and the opposition parties. Among other 
conditions, the proposals were set to require beneficiaries to accept jobs distant up to 50 
kilometres from his/her place of residence. Likewise, beneficiaries would lose their right to the 
benefit after refusing for the third time to take on a job offered to him/her considered  as suitable 
by the state employment or manpower office (INEM).  
12 Law 12/2001 makes provisions for tax breaks in social contributions to newly hired employees 
in needy situations (e.g. beneficiaries of minimum income schemes). It also awards status of 
insertion companies, alongside some fiscal privileges, to those hiring low-income workers. Note 
that despite the support provided by social agents to the establishment of these ‘productive’ 
businesses, no legal provisions have so far been implemented to regulate their activities.  
13 However, the amounts are rather low, and potential claimants often lack of information 
resources as to file petitions under this scheme. Others who work in the ‘underground economy’ 
simply prefer not  to ‘complicate things’. 
14 These policies have a markedly pro-natalist orientation and are reactive to the very low birth 
rate in Spain and the increasing participation of women in the labour market.  
15 At current, and further to the deductions related to the Mínimo Personal y Familiar, other tax 
breaks are available for working mothers with children under 3 years of years. However, 
discounts for school material for children between 3 and 15 years have been phased out.  
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government (i.e. regional). Important political decisions regarding the minimum 
income schemes, and the organisation and planning of the services developed 
according to the Plan Concertado, have reflected not only a higher degree of 
political dynamism by the Comunidades Autónomas. They have also underlined 
the subsidiary role played by local councils dependent to a great extent on 
regional financial sources and regional political concerns.16 Only the big cities 
have been able to challenge the mesogovernments as main protagonists in the 
development of social services.  
 
3. Poverty, social exclusion and ‘safety nets’ today  
 
During the 1960s and 1970s, analyses on poverty were generally carried out 
within more general research studies on social structure and change in Spain.17 
In the mid-1980s, and on the request of Caritas, the study on ‘poverty and 
marginalisation’ carried out by EDIS (1984) had a considerable impact not only 
in the media. It also provoked a wide debate in the public opinion. The study 
estimated that around 8 million of the Spaniards were poor (i.e. having less than 
50%of the income mean). The findings of the EDIS study allowed Caritas to 
initiate a campaign of demands to the public authorities. Following this debate 
the number of studies on poverty increased considerably (Arriba, 1999; Susín, 
2000). 
 
The main source of empirical evidence has been provided by the Spanish 
Survey on Family Accounts (Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares), which 
does periodical research on household consumption patterns and establishes 
various standards for measurement. It provides, among other indicators, data 
concerning increases in the cost of living.18  
 
In recent times, however, there has not been a systematic production of 
indicators and data. A look at Table 5 (included in the Spanish NAPSI) shows 
the wide disparity of figures concerning the Spanish poor population in the 2000 
according to different indicators.19 Considering, for instance, a poverty threshold 
of 60% of the median income, the number of Spanish poor reached the figure of 
more than 7 million. However, and according to the criteria set by the FOESSA 
Report of 1998, just half a million of Spaniards were in a situation of ‘extreme 
poverty’ (i.e. having less that 15% of the total average income). Note that 
around 200,000 was the number of beneficiaries of the regional minimum 
                                            
16 Articulated not only by nationalist and regionalist parties, but also by the increasingly important 
regional and federated branches of the main Spanish political formations (PP, PSOE, and IU) 
(Arriba, 1999). Internal processes of power accommodation within the Spanish parties have also 
greatly contributed to the internalisation by Spaniards of the federalisation of politics and policy-
making (Moreno, 2001c). 
17 Exception made of the FOESSA Reports under the auspices by Caritas (1967, 1970, 1975, 
1983). 
18 On this EPF Survey, as well as on the evolution, various sources, problems and limitations of 
the studies carried out on poverty in Spain, cf. Bazaga, Ramos and Tamayo (2000). 
19 Quantitativist views on poverty have been criticised because often falsify social reality and 
provide with lots of data that can be used to delay concrete action to improve living conditions of 
the destitute (Casado, 1990). 
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income benefits targeted to needy citizens with no other access to public 
subsidies.  
 
Data provided by the successive findings of the European Community 
Household Panel (ECHP) on household income is detailed and allows 
longitudinal studies and cross-country comparisons. However, a major limitation 
of the ECPH data in the case of Spain is that it does not provided territorially 
desegregated data at the regional level.  
 
As regards regional economic disparities, it should be observed that in Spain there 
is no such an abrupt North-South divide, as is the case of Italy. Traditionally the 
hinterland around the capital Madrid has been an economic periphery (both 
Castilles, Extremadura and part of Aragon), while the geographical periphery in 
the North (Basque Country), and the East (Balearic Islands, Catalonia, Valencia) 
has had important growth poles and industrial zones. Andalusia in the South and 
Galicia in the Northwest have remained as poorer areas.  
 
Diverse estimates carried out on the evolution of recent regional and individual 
economic disparities in Spain have confirmed that a reduction of inequalities 
concerning the per capita family income among Comunidades Autónomas has 
taken place during the 1990s. Evidence has shown that territorial unbalances 
account for only around 10 per cent of the personal inequalities and has tended 
to decrease during the 1980s. Personal redistribution produced by the impact of 
direct taxation, social contributions and monetary transfers has greatly reduced 
regional disparities in Spain by between 25 and 34 per cent (Moreno, 2002c).  
 
On comparing gross and disposable regional incomes, a small but significant 
change could be noted ten years after generalisation of the decentralisation 
process. In poorer regions the difference between disposable per capita income 
and gross per capita income was positive, while in richer regions the results were 
negative. These data seemed to corroborate the assumption that public sector 
transfers have considerably contributed to reduce regional inequalities (Ayala, 
1994). 
 
As shown in Table 6, in 1995 the Comunidades Autónomas with the lowest rates 
of poverty were the Basque Country, Madrid, Navarre (around 10% of the total 
population). These were followed by Asturias, Balearic Islands, Cantabria, 
Catalonia and La Rioja, a group with poverty rates around 15% but still lower than 
that of the Spanish national mean. In percentages close to the national mean 
there was a group of regions comprising Aragon, Galicia and Valencia. Finally, 
Andalusia, Canary Islands, Castille and Leon, Castille-La Mancha and Murcia has 
poverty rates above the national mean without reaching the 30% of their 
respective total populations. The ‘outlyer’ region concentrating the highest poverty 
rate was Extremadura with 37.5%.20 
 
                                            
20 Note, however, that in the period 1980-90, gross available income in Extremadura rose by 
four percentage points with respect to its comparison with the richest region in Spain, Madrid 
(Moreno, 2001c). 
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Turning into the functional dimension of poverty, analyses can be drawn from a 
study recently carried out and based upon ECPH data of the years 1994, 1995 
and 1996 (García Serrano, Malo and Toharia, 2001). As in other similar studies, 
findings relate to rates of relative individual poverty using indicators of 
equivalent income (according to OECD equivalent scales).21 In Table 7 rates of 
relative poverty according to different thresholds are compared for the period 
1994-96. Note that rates of relative poverty (both at 50% of mean and 60% of 
median income) decreased in such period. In 1996, 17.5% of the Spanish 
population was below the threshold of 50% relative poverty. In 1996, 2.7% of 
the population was facing severe poverty (25% of mean income), or 1.5% 
(using as threshold 25% of median income).  
 
Table 8 reproduces information about profiles and characteristics of individuals 
living below the threshold of relative poverty (50% of mean income). In the first 
column, there were percentages of poor grouped according to social groups. 
The ones at both age ends of the active population included higher rates of 
poverty (24.4% for the 16-24 years, and 20.1% for the 45-54 years). According 
to legal status, there were more divorced and widows living in poverty (24.9%) 
and among singles (20.1%). Poverty rates were also higher among individuals 
with low levels of formal education (21.4%). As regards types of household, 
rates were higher among larger ones (26.4% in households of 5 members, and 
30.6% in households of 6 or more members). Poverty rates of households with 
3 dependent children were 32.2%, and those with dependent children and one 
single parent reached 24.7%. Among the unemployed rates were also higher 
(38.3%), the same as happened with trainees (26%), self-employed (20%) or 
employed with family help (27%). Poverty rates were higher among workers 
with part-time jobs of 14 or less weekly hours (20.5%). Taking into account the 
sources of income, poverty rates were much higher in those groups of 
individuals living in households where their main sources of income were 
unemployment benefits (64.4%), followed by those receiving other type of social 
subsidies (36.6%), and by those living out of capital gains (20.7%). Such 
differences among social groups were confirmed by the distribution reproduced 
in the second column of the same Table 8.  
 
These data provides with a concise overview of poverty figures in Spain, but 
they offer a rather distorted situation. Beyond the establishment of static 
thresholds for the calculation of the various definitions of poverty, one 
consideration that is often missed in the analyses of poverty is the importance 
of family and households in peoples’ attitudes, expectations and decisions. In 
Southern European countries, severe poverty rates are lower due to the role of 
the family as a ‘clearing house’ in the distribution of material resources. Note 
that, individually considered, 36% of the total Spanish population was severe 
poor in 1993 (having less than a quarter of the mean equivalent household 
income per head), but they amounted to only 5% of the aggregate population 
living in households (Carabaña and Salido, 2002). 
 
 3.1. Low-income benefits 
                                            
21 This study does not deal with an increasingly area of interest related to children poverty 
(under 16 years-o-age).  
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A look at the Tables 9, 10 and 11 is illustrative of the various types of benefits 
and subsidies (both contributory and non-contributory) which composed the 
public ‘safety net’ in Spain. Benefits for low-income citizens can be grouped as 
follows: 
 
(A) Supplementary Social Security Benefits22  
 
-Social Security Minimum Pension Supplements (Complementos de 
Mínimos de Pensiones de la Seguridad Social). These are benefits whose 
function is to top up already provided pensions to a minimum threshold that is 
established legally. Claimants’ monthly income (excluded the amount received 
as pension) must not be higher than a limit fixed annually. The Minimum 
Supplements reach little more than 30% of the total contributory pensions 
(2,402,321 in the year 2000). In recent years the number of supplemented 
pensions has gradually decreased due to the longer contributory biographies of 
the new pensioners. They mostly relate to survivors’ pensions, as well as those 
in the Agrarian and Domestic Regimes of the Social Security. 
 
-Social Assistance Benefits for the Unemployed (Subsidios de 
desempleo): (a) the means-tested Subsidio por Desempleo is available to 
unemployed whose contributory benefit has finished (NB. Especially targeted 
for those with dependent children, or those over 52 years of age with difficulties 
to re-enter the labour market). During the year 2000, the mean figure of monthly 
beneficiaries was 367,851; (b) the Subsidio de Desempleo Agrario is available 
to unemployed workers included the Special Agrarian Regime within the Social 
Security system, and living in the poorer regions of Andalusia and Extremadura 
(224,170 monthly beneficiaries),23 and (c) the Renta Activa de Inserción 
Laboral, a benefit introduced in 2000 on an annual basis, which aims at 
facilitating labour insertion for long-term unemployed workers over 45 years of 
age, and who are in needy situations subject to means testing. This rentas 
activas had a limited impact in 2000, when they were implemented (3,966 
beneficiaries). However, it meant the adoption of an insertion criterion for 
unemployment subsidies similar to that of the regional minimum income 
schemes.  
 
(B) Non-contributory Social Security benefits 
 
-Non-contributory Social Security Pensions (Pensiones no Contributivas 
de la Seguridad Social, or PNCs), Assistance Pensions (Pensiones 
Asistenciales), and LISMI subsidies for the elderly and disabled (Subsidio de 
Garantía de Mínimos, LISMI) (NB. The latter in a gradual process of phasing 
out). The non-contributory pensions are benefits targeted on households of low-
                                            
22 Note that access to these benefits is only possible if there has been a previous contributory 
trajectory of the beneficiary, despite the possibility that this might has been insufficient to 
sustain the entitlement. 
23 Unemployment reform proposals put forward by the Spanish Government in the year 2002 
also include the gradual disappearance of the Agrarian subsidies (PER-REASS), and its 
substitution by a contributory regime for all eventual agrarian labourers similar to the general 
provisions for the unemployed.  
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income population of +65-years and the disabled (with a 65% of invalidity). 
Beneficiaries have not been contributory members of the Social Security system 
during their working life. During 2000, the monthly mean figure of non-
contributory pensioners was 471,275. Note that both Assistance and LISMI 
subsidies are subject to a gradual phasing out after the implementation of the 
PNCs in the year 1990 (Law 26/1990). They are still available for those 
beneficiaries who had access to LISMI before 1990 and were not included in 
the provisions of the PNCs. However, during 2000 there were 68,058 and 
83,471 Assistance and LISMI pensioners, respectively, whose benefits would 
be lower if they were to perceive the later implemented PNCs.  
 
-Family Benefits of the Social Security (Prestaciones Familiares de la 
Seguridad Social). They are low intensity benefits for dependent child/ren under 
18 years-of-age awarded to low-income families either with or without 
contributory biographies (see Table 11). They are slightly more generous in the 
case of handicapped children. Benefits amounts are higher in the case of 
children over 18 year with serious disability, and in this respect they can be 
considered as non-contributory pensions although its concession is 
incompatible with any other non-contributory benefit. During the year 2000, 
amounts were increased and other benefits such as one-off payments for the 
birth of third and successive children, as well as for multiple birth, were also 
implemented. Their impact in the non-contributory benefits awarded by the 
Social Security is very limited.  
 
(C) Regional Minimum Income Schemes (Rentas Mínimas de Inserción)  
 
They are non-contributory programmes regionally implemented by the 17 
Spanish Comunidades Autónomas with different characteristics but with the 
same general aim of social insertion for low-income or no-income families. 
Amounts of minimum income guaranteed vary according to the ‘generosity’ of 
each region. Access to these programmes and benefits is available for families 
whose income is lower than established thresholds by each region (in some of 
them there is an annual budgetary limit for the total amount of benefits to be 
awarded). Programme eligibility and continuity for beneficiaries in conditioned 
on their engagement in activities of social insertion. According to data collected 
by the Spanish General Directorate of Social Action, Minors and Family 
(Dirección General de Acción Social, del Menor y de la Familia), 78,645 families 
were receiving monthly these benefits in 2000 (for a more detailed analysis see 
chapter 4). 
 
 3.2. A fragmented ‘safety net’ 
 
Despite its fragmentation, an organising rationale can be identified in the 
configuration of the public ‘safety net’ protection in Spain. Figure 1 illustrates the 
various levels and itineraries of this basic social protection. 
 
Note that all benefits for the low-income are means-tested, although how this 
criteria is applied vary in some aspects. For instance, some benefits are paid to 
people already receiving contributory pensions (Social Security Minimum 
Pension Supplements), or to unemployed who exhausted their contributory 
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unemployment benefit period (Social Assistance Benefits for the Unemployed). 
Benefits in cases of the Non-contributory Social Security Pensions, Family 
Benefits of the Social Security and Regional Minimum Income subsidies can be 
claimed with no previous contribution to the Social Security system. Most of 
these cash benefits take into account the aggregate level of all-family income 
(or household) as a criterion for eligibility. Further to this, some subsidies are 
differential benefits that increase existing income to an established minimum, 
whereas others are provided as  final amounts.  
 
All these benefits provide cash amount which are lower than the legally 
established minimum wage (Tables 9 and 12). In other words, they provide a 
lower protection than that they could get were they to be active and employed in 
the formal labour market.24 The different benefits are ordered ranging from 
those which offer a better coverage to those more limited (in duration and 
intensity), and more conditioned with the compliance of activities related 
generally to labour activation. Variations in the awarding of the benefits depend 
on institutional milieus and civil servants discretionary criteria (at all three state, 
regional and local levels of government). Somehow the hierarchy of benefits is 
inversely coherent with the principle of territorial subsidiarity: the ‘better quality’ 
benefits are also the more centralised ones. It is also noticeable that access to 
‘better quality’ benefits is independent from the family income, 25 while the lower 
levels are family benefits strictu sensu.  
 
The contributory principle is the main criterion around which all different sub-
systems are organised and, thus, a relationship with the formal labour market 
background of the beneficiaries is established. All of those applicants to low-
income benefits who have secured a sufficient contribution to the Social 
Security can have better contributory benefits (retirement pensions, disability 
and survivors’, as well as unemployment benefits). When the contributory 
record of the claimant has come to a stop (unemployment), or is insufficient 
(pensions), means-tested benefits are to be supplemented so that a minimum 
established legally can be reached.  
 
In the event of no previous contribution to the Social Security , a preferential 
criterion is set also according to the labour market situation of the claimant (age 
or degree of invalidity) as happens with contributory benefits. For those workers 
who are not potentially active (over 65 years and disability over 65%), Social 
Security non-contributory pensions as well as LISMI and Assistance benefits 
are also available. Those claimants potentially active (under 65 years and with 
disability lower than 65%) can also be eligible under the regional programmes 
of minimum income.  
 
Age is an important protection marker for the grouping of claimants in different 
categories. The age of 65 years delimits active and non-active status. However, 
unemployment subsidies also take into account the specific situation of those 
                                            
24 Note that minimum wage amounts (salario mínimo interprofesional) are referred to full-time 
jobs. In the case of some regional minimum income programmes, and due to added amounts as 
family supplement s, the total benefit amount can be higher than that of the minimum wage.  
25 This is to be understood as the income of the household, or common unit of residence. 
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claimants over 45 and 52 years of age in order to allow for a relaxation of the 
eligibility criteria, the extension of the benefit duration, and other related 
circumstances. At the other end, for needy claimants under the age of 25 years 
benefits have the family as unit of reference (exception made of those already 
in the formal labour market or who have their own family). Note, however, that 
family benefits for dependent children have as upper limit the age of 18 years 
(Appendix I reproduces a listing of national legislation on benefits for the low-
income). 
 
As regards the regional minimum income schemes it has to be pointed out their 
residual or subsidiary role with respect to schemes of insertion mainly of the 
Social Security system. They have taken on board beneficiaries derived to them 
from programme reduction, changes and insufficiencies of the main protection 
schemes (contributory and non-contributory). This regards not only income 
maintenance but also other policies on education, housing or health (Serrano 
and Arriba, 1998). 
 
3.3. The Spanish NAPSI: Plan Nacional de Acción para la Inclusión 
Social del Reino de España 
 
Following the commitment expressed at the Lisbon European Council (June 
2000) and the EU objectives agreed at the Nice European Council (December 
2000),26 the Spanish central Government, under the co-ordination of the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, prepared the National Action Plan on 
Social Inclusion for the period 2001-2003.27 Together with the Plans elaborated 
by the other EU country members, the European Commission and the Council 
were commissioned to submit a Joint Report on Social Inclusion for the 
Brussels-Laeken European Council of December 2001 (Ferrera, Matsaganis 
and Sacchi, 2002). 
 
The Plan Secretariat was organically located at the General Sub-Directorate of 
Programmes of Social Services, within the General Directorate for Social 
Action, Minors and Family of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. Thus, 
responsibility for the co-ordination in the elaboration of the Spanish NAPSI 
remained with the central administration, which is a layer of government with 
residual powers concerning social assistance and social services. In fact, it can 
be said that central institutions play a subsidiary role with respect to the regions 
in matters of social welfare. Activities of the Plan Secretariat were carried out by 
five officials of the General Sub-Directorate of Programmes of Social Services. 
Neither extra budgetary provision was made available to the Secretariat, nor 
officials from other governmental bodies were involved in the workings.28  
                                            
26 Four objectives were then established: (1) to facilitate participation in employment and access 
by all citizens to the resources, rights, goods and services; (2) to prevent the risk of exclusion; 
(3) to help the most vulnerable; and (4) to mobilise all the relevant bodies. 
27 Data in this section has been collected from the text published as Plan Nacional para la 
Inclusión del Reino de España, as well as information provided viva voce in interviews made to 
two members of the Plan Secretariat  in February, 2002. We are grateful for their collaboration.  
28 Nothing that can be compared to the resources devoted in other similar processes, such as 
those related to Employment Plans. Let us say that some external support was hired for the 
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The strategy displayed by the Plan Secretariat was to count on the participation 
and contribution provided by other institutions involved actively in the 
programmes of fight against poverty and exclusion; (a) public bodies (central, 
regional and local governments); (b) social partners (trade unions and 
Economic and Social Council);l29 and (c) NGOs and experts.30 Liaison activities 
and working meetings with representatives of the institutions involved were 
crucial for the preparation of early draft reports. As a matter of fact, and given 
the lack of executive and political powers of the central government concerning 
the issues to be dealt with, high-ranked politicians were involved in the 
launching of the Secretariat activities so that technical intra- and inter-
governmental co-ordination could be optimised.31 The support from the NGOs 
was channelled through the Spanish Council of Institutions for Social Action 
(Consejo Estatal de Entidades de Acción Social, which was established on 
February 19, 2001), and by means of bilateral meetings.32 
 
Thus, the main task for the institutions involved in the activities of the 
Secretariat was data collection regarding the four objectives established in EU’s 
Nice Summit.33 Accordingly, the Spanish NAPSI should not be regarded as a 
                                                                                                                                
processing of data and information.  
29 The Spanish Economic and Social Council, created by the 1978 Constitution (article 131.2), 
came into being in 1991, when Parliament passed the Act that set it up. It has the status of a 
government advisory body, which allows for the economic and social partners to participate in 
economic and social policy decision-making. The Council is composed of sixty one members, 
including its Chairman. There are three groups: (1) Twenty members representing labour 
organisations; (2) Twenty members representing business organisations; and (3) Three 
members for the farming sector, three for the shipping-fishing sector, four for consumers and 
users, four for the co-operative sector, and six Government-appointed experts. Members are 
appointed under the proposal of the organisations which represent for a four-year term and may 
be re-appointed for similar periods. Note that the Council must issue a mandatory opinion on 
preliminary drafts of State Acts and draft Royal Statutory Instruments regulating socio-economic 
and labour issues, as well as draft Royal Decrees considered to be of special importance by the 
Government. Additionally, it performs an important job in promoting dialogue, which leads 
organisations that legitimately defend clearly distinct interests to find common points and share 
growing spheres of opinion. 
30 Among which the Spanish Ombudsman Office (Defensor del Pueblo) was also to be included. 
31 These meetings reflected the somewhat subordinate role of those civil servants responsible 
of social services and assistance vis-à-vis other ministerial bodies of the central government. In 
this context collaboration was sought at the highest levels of the political representation.  
32 There was a previous institutional contact between the General Directorate for Social Action, 
Minors and Family and several of the NGOs which participated in the process of elaboration of 
the Spanish NAPSI. Let us remember that those organisations usually participate in 
programmes financed by general taxation regarding projects of social action. They are funded 
with 0.5% of those income tax payments so explicitly targeted by taxpayers in their annual 
income tax statements (the other option is to transfer such moneys to the RC Catholic Church). 
In the year 1998, 89,9 million € were collected under this 0.5% entry, an amount which is an 
important source of funding for many of these non-profit organisations.  
33 Data and information were collected by the completion of standardised forms regarding the 
four objectives established in EU’s Nice Summit and with relation to policies and targeted 
groups. In this way, and for each programme/policy characteristics of the less-favoured groups, 
number of beneficiaries, human and budgetary resources (for both the past year 2000 and the 
estimates for 2001-2002) were requested. The collected information was aggregated and 
systematised into what are the central contents of the NAPSI.  
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Plan for new strategies or for a reorientation of actions already established by 
the various governmental bodies involved in the fight against social exclusion. It 
is rather an exhaustive recompilation of the various policies and programmes 
implemented at the various layers of government and by the concerned civil 
society organisations.  
 
Perhaps the most relevant achievement of the Spanish NAPSI has been the 
active intergovernmental participation and the involvement of social partners 
and stakeholders. Different perspectives were expressed by the participants, 
which indicated the difficulties in articulating common institutional grounds in the 
fight against poverty and social exclusion in Spain. The Secretariat neither had 
an easy task in securing information provided horizontally by other ministerial 
bodies of the central governmental, nor by others layers of government 
(regional, principally), with regard to other sectoral policies (education, 
employment or housing).34 Generally speaking, these problems of inter-
administrative co-operation are better dealt with once ‘informal’ relationships are 
established. Less is to be expected from a spontaneous collaboration among 
representatives of the various institutional actors premised on a formal common 
interest. This behaviour may explain why hardly any information could be 
incorporated in some areas related to the workings of the Spanish NAPSI. 
 
Participation of civil society organisations involved representatives of the Red 
Cross, Caritas, the Gypsy Secretariat and the CERMI (Comité Español de 
Representantes de Minusválidos, Spanish Committee of Disabled 
Representatives). These NGOs are equipped with better material infrastructure 
and human resources. Accordingly, they were able to make not only 
comprehensive proposals, but could also articulate strong critical views, 
something which other rank-and-file associations could not afford.35  
 
The Spanish NAPSI does not put forward new ideas. It provides with a picture 
of what is already being carried out by the different social actors and 
stakeholders involved in programmes of social inclusion. The existing structures 
of social protection are not scrutinised or even questioned in the NAPSI. The 
main reason for this continuity rationale has to be found in the general 
budgetary aim embraced by most PP Government policies: the ‘zero deficit’. 
Consequently, no extra funding or budgetary provision was to be incorporated 
to the Plan. Others factors to be taken into account have to do with the 
fragmented nature of the system of social protection in Spain and, above all, 
with the deep process of decentralisation of welfare competencies (Appendix II 
reproduces a summary of indicators to monitor the Plan).  
 
                                            
34 The task was much easier for those Comunidades Autónomas which had elaborated their 
Integral Plans of Fight against Exclusion (as was the case of the Basque country). These Plans 
had been carried out prior to the periodical reviews of their own minimum income schemes.  
35 Caritas produced a comprehensive Plan proposal (Cáritas, 2001). This document was highly 
critical towards the existing policies of social inclusion in Spain, but many of its proposal were 
incorporated into the final version of the Spanish NAPSI. This lack of comprehensive proposals 
by the Spanish government greatly explains why ONGs such as Caritas took a leading role in 
the elaboration of the Plan (Razón y Fé, 2001).  
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The NAPSI is structured according to four objectives established at the EU Nice 
Summit. A good deal of actions, measures and proposals makes reference to 
already existing governmental plans: e.g. Employment Plan (Plan Nacional de 
Empleo) (objective 1.1);36 reinforcement of the pensions system, according to 
the agreement on improvement of social protection reached by the employers’ 
associations and the trade union CCOO on April, 2001 (objective 1.2); and 
access to new technologies (Plan Info XXI) (objective 2). The various Sectoral 
Plans of the General Secretary of Social Affairs (within the Ministry of Labour 
and Social Affairs) provide the bases for actions targeted on specific groups and 
related to objective 3 (Gerontology, Equal Opportunities, Voluntary Work, Fight 
against Domestic Violence, Disability, Youth, or Family and Job Conciliation). 
Concerning vulnerable collectives an innovative action is included for the 
homeless.  
 
An improvement in the benefit system for the low-income, along the lines of 
objective 1.2, is proposed by means of reaching a consensus among the central 
ministries involved in order to establish a general basic scheme. However the 
operationalisation of this scheme does not seem easy to achieve as is analysed 
further below. Eligibility and access to low-income benefits also include access 
to education, health, housing and social services. Regarding other systems of 
social protection the collected data is somehow incomplete (with the exception 
of that of social services). Unfortunately, there are hardly any commitments 
concerning those other areas of intervention, due mostly to inter-ministerial 
difficulties of co-ordination. Furthermore, most competencies on social 
assistance and services rest with regions. Thus, intergovernmental co-operation 
and agreements are needed, and should be also incorporated to the Regional 
Plans according to objective 2 set in Nice.  
 
Among the contributions made by the Spanish NAPSI two can be underlined. 
First, the elaboration of Territorial Action Plans for Social Inclusion (or TAPSIs), 
a commitment assumed by the 17 Spanish Comunidades Autónomas,37 with a 
particular reference to Local Plans for Social Inclusion to be developed by 
municipalities representing up to 40% of the total Spanish population (objective 
2). The Spanish NAPSI locates the main responsibility for the fight against 
exclusion at the regional level and, in so doing, action is delayed until such 
TAPSIs are accomplished.38 Once again it has to be pointed out that, given the 
decentralised structure of the Spanish ‘State of Autonomies’ (Estado de las 
                                            
36 A workfare priority already included in the Spanish National Action Plan for Employment was 
labour activation for socially excluded groups. The Employment Plan regarded the 
implementation of specific policies to facilitate insertion in the labour market.  
37 In some of them, TAPSIs had already been elaborated (Basque Country, Canary Islands, 
Castille and Leon, Castille-La Mancha, Catalonia, La Rioja and Navarre). Others were in  the 
process of elaboration, such as Madrid. These Plans incorporate as core policy instruments the 
regional minimum income schemes for insertion (Rentas Mínimas de Inserción).  
38 Let us remind that the ‘mimesis effect’ rule among the Comunidades Autónomas made 
possible the generalisation of an initiative such as the minimum income guaranteed all over 
Spain during the 1990s. Then, intergovernmental co-operation was feeble, if non-existent, but a 
bottom-up policy innovation was possible. Now the situation has been somewhat reversed and 
it remains to be seen whether a top-down initiative achieves a similar degree of efficacy (Arriba, 
1999).  
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Autonomías), the active involvement of the Spanish Comunidades Autónomas 
is to be regarded as crucial for the actual implementation of the Spanish NAPSI. 
 
A second contribution refers to the crucial importance that mobilisation by social 
actors and stakeholders should have for the future viability of the Spanish 
NAPSI (objective 4). The Plan foresees the establishment of several multi-level 
committees and commissions for the optimisation of information exchange and 
group participation, including NGOs, experts, practitioners and media leaders.  
 
Resource co-ordination and data systematisation in the fight of social exclusion 
are paramount concerns in a quasi-federal country such as Spain. The 
unlikeness of having a hierarchical executive leadership responsible for 
intergovernmental relations, and which could homogenise unilaterally 
agreements and practices, makes more plausible the goal of achieving efficient 
consociational practices and joint efforts. These are usually complex, and even 
tortuous for lineal paradigms of action, but enjoy a higher degree of legitimacy 
in a plural state as the Kingdom of Spain.  
 
Finally, and in order to provide with the necessary funding, a formal statement 
by the central Spanish Government was incorporated in the Spanish NAPSI. It 
stated that the actual implementation of the Plan was dependent on having 
available moneys in the 2001/02/03 National Budgets. Financial estimates for 
the 2001-03 period are reproduced in Table 13. Note that if the commitment by 
all governmental bodies involved --and very especially the Spanish central 
ministries-- were to be accomplished, the annual increase of the funding for the 
fight against exclusion in Spain for the years 2001 and 2002 would be of 8% per 
year, approximately. As already pointed out, the achievement of ‘zero deficit’ for 
purposes of budgetary stability is the overriding economic policy set by the PP 
Government. Unquestionably this imposes limits for future policy developments.  
 
4. Regional Minimum Incomes Schemes (Rentas Mínimas de Inserción) 
 
The Spanish mesogovernments of the Comunidades Autónomas have shown 
an active interest for policy innovation concerning welfare programmes. Among 
the various actions taken by them one is to be identified as having far-reaching 
repercussions for the weaving of ‘safety nets’ of social protection in Spain: the 
programmes of minimum income of insertion (Rentas Mínimas de Inserción).  
 
The general process started in September of 1988 with the announcement by 
the Basque Government of a regional Plan de Lucha contra la Pobreza 
(Programme against Poverty). This initiative sparked off a regional mimesis, or 
‘demonstration effect’, on the part of the other 16 Comunidades Autónomas. By 
the end of 1990s, all Spanish mesogovernments were engaged in the 
implementation of regional programmes of minimum income (Appendix III 
reproduces a listing of regional legislation on benefits for the low-income).  
 
Some of the programmes of minimum income were established mainly on the 
initiative of the mesogovernments, and as a result of the combined action by 
both types of policy-makers (elected politicians and executive officials). In some 
other cases, the pressure exerted by the opposition parties in the regional 
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parliaments was the main factor behind the elaboration of these programmes. 
Finally, a third path of policy-making was due to the mobilisation of the regional 
branches of the main trade unions (CCOO and UGT), as well as some 
significant NGOs, such as Caritas.  
 
 4.1. Main features of the regional programmes 
 
As a proviso, the lack of comprehensive and systematic information compiled 
on these programmes should be acknowledged. Within a common framework 
for the provision of minimum income and the implementation of insertion 
activities, the regional programmes have their own peculiarities. On the 
available information there is a temporal mismatch which makes systematic 
analyses difficult. Regional sources are multiple and not always follow similar 
patterns of data collection. Thus, analyses will mainly take into account 
assessments mainly made on the first period of implementation of regional 
Rentas Mínimas de Inserción  (1989-94). 
 
The regional programmes of minimum income have distinct characteristics with 
regard to the intensity of the benefits and the insertion obligations to be 
complied by the beneficiaries. However, they are quasi-universalistic 
entitlements, which combine cash benefits with activation policies and 
programmes of social integration (employment promotion and vocational training 
courses, primarily). Their main common features can be identified as follows:  
 
(a) Families are the units of reference even though individuals can be single 
beneficiaries.  
(b) Means-tested criteria is related to a threshold of household income under 
which cash benefits are awarded (around two thirds of the minimum wage). 
(c) Residence status of applicants is required (ranging from 1 to 10 years). 
(d) Periods of extension are available provided that beneficiaries have complied 
with social insertion activities and social needs remain the same. 
 
Indeed, policy outcomes have resulted in some visible differences in the 
intensity of the benefits and, above all, the nature of the ‘insertion’ programmes 
to be accomplished by the beneficiaries. According to these differences three 
groups of the regional programme of Rentas Mínimas de Inserción can be 
identified (Laparra and Aguilar, 1997):  
 
(a) Those establishing a link between the perception of the subsidy and the aim 
of insertion; 
(b) Those where insertion takes the form of a job contract, and the benefits are 
subject to workfare;  
(c) Those discretionary and ad hoc social assistance.  
 
According to these criteria a typology of regional minimum income schemes can 
be established as follows:  
 
Typology of regional programmes of minimum income of insertion 
 Renta mínima de inserción Protected social employment  
Renta mínima Basque Country  
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de inserción 
(in full) 
 
Renta mínima 
de inserción 
(limited) 
Madrid 
Catalonia 
Navarre 
Legislated 
programmes 
of minimum 
subsidies  
Aragon* 
Galicia 
Murcia* 
La Rioja* 
Asturias 
Castille-La Mancha 
Programmes 
of a lower 
coverage and 
intensity 
Canaries 
Cantabria 
Castille and Leon 
Valencia  
Extremadura 
Andalusia 
* The small amount of the benefits involved are to some extent compensated by 
other subsidies of family integration 
 
Source: Aguilar, Gaviria and Laparra, 1995 
 
The programme implemented in the Basque country is the one which can be 
considered as a ‘genuine’ minimum income scheme of insertion. As reproduced 
above these lines, there are other programmes which could be regarded as 
minimum incomes schemes with some limitations, due to restrictive elements 
mostly of a budgetary nature. The third group refers to minimum subsidies with 
legal restrictions, and a final one is characterised by a very limited coverage and 
intensity. Further to this, there are workfare programmes which prioritise 
temporary job of ‘social usefulness’, and which residually provide periodical cash 
benefits. In any case, this classification should be re-assessed as several of the 
regional programmes have been adjusted and modified in recent years. At current 
an evaluative exercise taken into account all regional programmes is very much 
needed.  
 
On explaining the differences in policy outcomes, the variable financial 
manoeuvrability has been adduced as the main explanatory factor. Certainly, 
the Basque Country and Navarre with a system of fiscal quasi-independence 
have been able to fund more generously their programmes of minimum income. 
Note that as compared with the autonomous public spending in Catalonia, the 
Basque per capita expenditure is 1,8 higher.39 Nevertheless, the setting of 
political priorities in policy funding appears to be the most compelling 
explanatory element. After all, the Spanish mesogovernments have the final 
budgetary say in the running of a type of programmes which are the product of 
their own initiative.  
 
-Access to programmes and criteria of eligibility 
 
                                            
39 According to 1995 data, the mean non-financial per capita autonomous spending carried out 
by Catalonia and Galicia was Euro 1,373, which compared to Euro 2,509 in the Basque 
Country. 
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In the majority of the Comunidades Autónomas an annual amount is fixed to 
cover the expenditure associated to the programme and, once this is 
exhausted, no more beneficiaries can be accepted. In some other regions, 
where the entitlement to the minimum income is guaranteed, a set of indicators 
is established for claimants. In this section, we refer to accessibility and 
eligibility criteria common to most of the regional programmes: Specific 
requisites to comply with are a follows:  
 
(a) Nationality and residence. Nationality is not a requirement to have access to 
minimum income programmes in most of regions (exception made of Cantabria 
and Canary Islands). However, a certain period of registered residence of the 
beneficiary in the Comunidad Autónoma is required in all programmes. Initially, 
regional policy-makers feared of some kind of ‘welfare tourism’ (beneficiaries 
moving around the country to apply for the most generous subsidies), although 
this has not proved to the case later on. In some regions the residence 
precondition is a clear disincentive for the illegal immigration in a policy domain 
in which the central administration has adopted a tough ‘law-and-order’ 
approach, and there is a clear absence of a comprehensive intergovernmental 
plan of action. Requirements vary from the obligation for the potential 
beneficiary of having resided since a concrete date (e.g. 1985 in Cantabria), to 
long periods of residence (e.g. 10 years in Navarre or 5 years in Galicia). In 
some Comunidades the prerequisite of residence is shorter and ranges from 2 
or 3 years in Catalonia and La Rioja, to 1 year in Valencia, or none in the case 
of Castille-La Mancha. 
 
(b) Household formation and composition. Regional minimum income benefits 
have families as units of reference. The application is submitted by an individual 
who, once the benefit is awarded, is responsible for its family distribution. In 
consequence, all members of the family have access to the subsidy through 
one direct claimant/beneficiary.40 There are several definitions of what a ‘family 
unit’ is and diverse degrees of  lineage are taken into account. The diverse 
effects of these family definitions are difficult to be measured, but there are two 
worth mentioning: (a) definitions of a more extended type of family imply the 
possible inclusion of other relatives’ income; and (b) the possibility of receiving 
two or more subsidies in one single household.41  
 
In all regional schemes there is no discrimination concerning single households, 
although in some Comunidades this type of households is considered an 
                                            
40 In practice, this procedure is rather problematic. On the one hand, the legal beneficiary can 
make an abusive and personal use of the benefit. On the other, the beneficiary could also be 
overburdened with insertion obligations signed on accepting the subsidy (NB. In many cases 
he/she is the only one having contacts with the responsible social workers). In some qualitative 
studies it has been noted that contacts with social workers is mainly carried out by a woman of 
the family, despite the fact that the entitlement is generally awarded to ‘the man of the family’. In 
the particular case of Aragon, the entitlement can be shared and the cash benefits can 
accordingly be divided between adult members of the family. Problems of a practical nature and 
‘perverse’ effects in the implementation of these programmes have been sorted out in many 
cases in a contingent manner (Serrano and Arriba, 1998).  
41 This is the case, for instance, of some extended families with elderly members entitled to old-
age pensions. Ad hoc adjustments in these cases have been made together with a certain 
flexibilisation of legal requirements.  
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‘exception’ rather than a rule. As a matter of fact, single households 
beneficiaries form one of the most sizeable groups of beneficiaries of the 
regional minimum income schemes.  
 
Regional norms also make provision concerning family formation. Requirements 
in this respect aim at avoiding ‘artificial’ family creation in order to qualify for 
minimum income benefits. Prerequisites range from 6 till 12 months for an 
‘independent’ household to be eligible. In some regions such a requirement is 
exempted, or in the case that households are the result of family ruptures.  
 
(c) Age. Most regional requirements set age limits between 25 and 65 years. 
Protection for citizens over 65 years rests mainly with non-contributory 
pensions. In this way, regional minimum income plays a subsidiary role with 
respect to social security benefits.42 On adopting the lower age limit fixed by the 
French RMI (25 years),43 it is implicitly acknowledged the supporting role of the 
family until the young family member is expected to be in a position of economic 
emancipation, i.e. he/she having entered the formal labour market and being in 
a position to establish his/her own family (Aguilar, Gaviria and Laparra, 1995). 
Implicit in the setting of this age is a certain attitude of ‘paternalistic’ reluctance 
towards the kind of uses that youngsters under 25 years could do with these 
cash benefits.  
 
(d) Economic resources of the beneficiaries. In all Comunidades Autónomas 
access to the benefits is cleared once it is tested that family income is lower to 
the amount of the renta mínima to be perceived. In some Comunidades 
Autónomas, the basic amount is established automatically in reference to the 
minimum wage. In others, the amount of reference is that of the mean non-
contributory pension. However, in most cases the amount is fixed in the annual 
budget by the regional parliament.  
 
In those programmes associated to ‘protected special employment’ (see 
Typology above), various options are arranged to calculate the level of the 
subsidy (higher, in the case of Navarre, and lower in Andalusia, Asturias, and 
Castille-La Mancha). 
 
Basic amount supplements are added for each of the family members 
(according to equivalence scales). In most regional programmes supplements 
are calculated according to the number of family members with disregard to 
their composition (e.g. adults, minors or disabled). Supplement amounts 
diminish as the number of family members increase. In some cases maximum 
limits have been established according to two modalities: (a) once reached a 
number of family members there is no further supplement; (b) an aggregate top 
amount is put as a limit. Let us remind that, in general, equivalence ratios are 
                                            
42 Note that, despite their non-contributory nature, the Social Security is responsible for the 
payment of these pensions. Main problems associated to such age limits are: (a) amounts 
provided by non-contributory pensions can be lower than that of rentas mínimas; and (b) non-
contributory benefits of citizens over 65 years of age with dependent family members may be 
clearly insufficient .  
43 Exception made of those cases of under 25-year-of-age beneficiaries with dependent family 
members who are included. 
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very flat (NB. Usually the amount for the second family member does not go 
over 30% of the head of the family). Note that from the final calculated amount 
of renta mínima any available income of the family is detracted.  
 
(e) Means-testing. Programmes of rentas mínimas have different methods to 
take into account family income, particularly that from labour and other social 
benefits in order to avoid a reduction of protection, or to produce labour 
disincentives. Accordingly, labour income is subtracted partially in some 
regional programmes, whereas in others an exempted amount is established. 
(Aragon). Concerning other low-income benefits, most Comunidades 
Autónomas subtract integrally the amount perceived as non-contributory 
pension by the beneficiary. Some others do it partially as concerns income from 
social subsidies perceived by other family members, and in order to prevent 
unwanted effects of family breakage (e.g. Madrid). Concerning contributory 
family benefits some regional programmes consider them incompatible with the 
renta mínima, while others subtract them or, conversely, do not take them into 
account (Madrid, Catalonia). As regards those benefits targeted to cover 
specific needs (e.g. scholarships, transport allowances, medicine payments, 
emergency help, etc.) the common procedure is not to take them into account 
for the calculation of the amount of the minimum income benefit.  
 
Most programmes also refer to patrimonial resources. In some instances they 
are assessed according to its gains (e.g. Madrid or Asturias). In others, they are 
used as indicators of sufficient means of standard of living and, in general, are 
considered to be incompatible with the awarding of the renta mínima. In most 
cases the value of owned houses where beneficiaries live is not taken into 
account.  
 
While in some Comunidades Autónomas the general criteria is to discard an 
strict regime of incompatibilities, in others these are established in a more 
contingent manner, and taking into account the type of labour activities of the 
claimant, the family and social benefits already perceived, and so forth.  
 
(f) Commitments and obligations. All regional programmes establish a number 
of obligations to be accomplished by the beneficiaries. Basically they refer to 
the commitment to use the renta mínima to cover basic needs of the household, 
to inform of any variations in the family unit, to reimburse any undue income 
and to apply to other subsidies to which the beneficiary may be entitled. 
 
The aim of insertion embraced by all regional programmes is articulated in 
some programmes as a ‘double entitlement’ and in others as a ‘counter-benefit’ 
(contraprestación), or reciprocity by the beneficiary towards the community. In 
some schemes commitments are requested not to refuse to take up a job offer 
or to carry out activities, either workfare or ‘social’. Other requirements include 
the prohibition of public begging, the compulsory schooling of children, the 
registration in job centres and the adoption of a ‘favourable’ attitude towards 
insertion.  
 
 -Programme provision and administration 
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Matters concerning programme management are also heterogeneous. 
Claimants need first to make an application in order for the process to be 
initiated. Usually the application is submitted at the municipal units of 
community care (unidades de atención primaria de servicios sociales), as well 
as at the regional offices of social services. In Catalonia some non-profit making 
NGOs are entitled to the management of the programme. On applying 
claimants must produce a number of documents to support the compliance of 
programme requirements. In some cases this first step appears to be 
insurmountable because of the problems of some claimants to fully understand 
the requested information (Serrano and Arriba, 1998). 
 
The decision process on the applications finalises after a fixed period of 
assessment (something which not always is accomplished). Since the date of 
submission until the actual receipt of the first payment the duration of the 
process oscillates from 4 to 8 months (Ayala, 2001). Programme monitoring and 
surveillance of the obligations to be accomplished by the beneficiaries are 
responsibilities of the local social services.  
 
In some Comunidades Autónomas the continuation of the programme is simply 
conditional to the maintenance of the initial circumstances of the beneficiaries 
(e.g. Basque Country). In others, there is a maximum period of 6 months within 
a fiscal year. In most cases, however, the awarding of the benefit is for 6 
months which can be extended to a similar period, although some regional 
programmes do not include automatic extension.  
 
-Insertion activities 
 
In the mid-1990s44 only the Basque programme was to be considered a 
‘genuine’ programme guaranteeing simultaneously the ‘double entitlement’ to 
cash benefits and insertion. In the rest of the cases both cash benefits and 
insertion activities appear as differentiated elements. In general, the latter is 
subordinated to the former in various degrees and manners. This relationship of 
subordination materialises with the signing of a contract by the beneficiaries.  
 
Insertion activities are usually individualised. In many Comunidades Autónomas 
they are determined at different administrative levels of the regional systems of 
social services. However, in some instances participation of beneficiaries in 
working-out the kind of individualised activities of insertion is required. 
 
In most cases social insertion is related to the carrying-out of activities of a 
productive nature. Classification of activities can be distinguished as follows 
(Aguilar, Gaviria and Laparra, 1995):  
 
- Area of social services and social work; personal promotion, 
access to systems of social protection, eradication of begging 
and occupational, leisure and/or therapeutical activities.  
                                            
44 Some later reforms have aimed at achieving a minimum income scheme in sensu strictu, with 
no direct linkage to insertion, very much along the lines of late developments of the French RMI.  
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- Area of education: further adult education and instruction for 
minors.  
- Area of employment: orientation and motivation, professional 
training, workfare incentives, self-employment and social 
economy, social employment and insertion companies.  
- Area of co-operation: community help and care for the elderly.  
 
A good deal of these insertion activities falls into other department 
competencies (education, employment, health or housing). Some regional 
programmes do not take into account --at least explicitly-- any interdepartmental 
co-ordination or joint committee for this purpose. In other cases, programme 
administrators have found problems of horizontal co-ordination along the lines 
of what has been previously commented regarding the elaboration of the 
Spanish NAPSI. 
 
Minimum income programmes include mechanisms for specific insertion needs. 
Among them we refer to the so-called ‘projects of insertion’. They are 
programmes with different labels and designs which share some common 
features: (a) they generally seek to finance targeted non-profit organisations; (b) 
activities are targeted for excluded groups, usually beneficiaries of minimum 
income programmes; and (c) insertion activities mainly include professional 
training and orientation to enter the labour market. Their scope is limited 
although their main input has been to provide with a space of collaboration with 
non-profit associations, to carry out intensive work with some collectives 
especially vulnerable and to allow for the experimentation of new forms of 
support to social insertion. Among them new companies of insertion have 
emerged which operate in the ‘open market’ and have employed workers with a 
previous record of exclusion.  
 
 4.2. Policy implementation 
 
There have been different actors shaping policy inputs and design of the 
programmes of Rentas Mínimas de Inserción. However the mesogovernments 
of the Spanish Comunidades Autónomas are to be regarded as the main 
protagonists in their implementation. Let us not forget that, prior to the approval 
by the regional parliaments, no explicit popular demand was expressed in any 
of the Comunidades Autónomas as to encourage their implementation. The 
institutional factor making relevant the issue of the minimum income guaranteed 
was precisely the constitutional entitlement for the regions to exercise their 
political autonomy. No reactive ‘path dependency’ could be referred to in this 
case. This fact validates the assumption that policy innovation concerning social 
policies developed by sub-state communities with a ‘cosmopolitan localism’ 
perspective can be more effective and efficient (Moreno, 2001b).  
 
The central Ministry for Social Affairs showed no little reticence with the 
implementation of the regional programmes of minimum income. Its main 
reluctance concerned arguments of poverty dependency and labour 
disincentives. Allegations that these new regional policies could affect territorial 
solidarity throughout Spain were among its criticisms (Ministerio de Asuntos 
Sociales, 1989). However, the then newly-created Ministry had already opted 
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for making the generalisation of the non-contributory pensions its main priority, 
exhausting in this ambitious programme most of its political capital within the 
central government. The initiative taken by the Comunidades Autónomas left 
little room for the institutional manoeuvring of the central Ministry, and was 
grounded on those constitutional provisions safeguarding regional self-
government. Within this context, no action to boycott the implementation of the 
regional programmes of minimum income was to be expected from the PSOE 
central Government.  
 
Since the beginning of the process, different arguments in favour or against the 
implementation of the regional Rentas Mínimas de Inserción were neither clear 
nor sophisticated in their analyses (Aliena, 1991). In this respect, the ‘simplicity’ 
of the trend-setting arguments used by the Basque policy-makers is very 
illustrative:  
 
(i) The Rentas Mínimas de Inserción were to overcome social marginalisation; 
(ii) No labour passivity was to be encouraged;  
(iii) EU recommendations and other European experiences, such as the French 
Revenu Minimum d’Insertion, lent support to the programme;  
(iv) There was a high degree of inter-party consensus and support from various 
Basque civil institutions.  
 
Probably, among the factors above mentioned, the reference to EU 
recommendations is of particular importance. There was constant reference to 
the proposals made by the European Commission encouraging the recasting of 
the European systems of social protection so that guaranteed income could 
facilitate social and labour insertion to poor and excluded citizens. This became 
the main line of argument for the formulation of the regional Rentas Mínimas de 
Inserción.  
 
Subsequently, the main trade unions supported these programmes. They 
pursued a course of action alternative to the traditional negotiation and eventual 
agreement at the national level. In fact, the climate of national confrontation 
between the central government and the trade unions induced these 
negotiations at the regional level. Note that, between the autumn of 1989 and 
the spring of 1989, all the pacts subscribed between the mesogovernments and 
the trade unions (CCOO and UGT) included the establishment of programmes 
of minimum income.  
 
In parallel, a number of NGOs (RC Church institutions, principally) committed 
themselves to support the Rentas Mínimas de Inserción, both at regional level 
(Caritas parish councils), but also nation-wide (Spanish Caritas). They 
demanded the implementation of the programmes of minimum income but did 
not participate in the forums where policy design was discussed (with the 
exception of Catalonia).  
 
Information about the various modalities and characteristics of the regional 
programmes was circulated among the Comunidades Autónomas. Formal and 
ad hoc meetings took place in which policy-makers and experts exchanged 
views and opinions on different aspects of the programmes to be implemented. 
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Their main models of reference were the RMI, in France, and the ‘Programme 
against Poverty’, in the Basque Country.  
 
The Comunidades Autónomas elaborated their programmes of rentas mínimas  
in various manners. In some cases, think-tanks of politicians, officials and 
experts within the organic structure of the regional departments of social policy 
prepared the pieces of legislation ‘behind-closed-doors’. In others, the process 
was open to the inputs made by trade unions or NGOs. However, the ultimate 
decision on the elaboration of the programmes remained with the 
mesogovernments. 
 
In the phase of actual implementation of the programmes, the Comunidades 
Autónomas had to establish institutional agreements with the local authorities 
within their territories. The latter were to be the executive cornerstone in the 
programmes’ design. Such agreements, however, brought about some delays 
in the implementation of the programme due to discrepancies stemming from 
the often different political colouring of the local and regional administrations 
involved. This was evident in the case of large cities such as Barcelona 
controlled by the Left, but with a Centre-right nationalist coalition at the 
Generalitat government, or Madrid, with a Right-to-centre City Hall and a Left 
regional administration. ‘Pretexts’ for conflict and institutional warfare referred in 
most cases to problems of financing, as well as to the lack of infrastructure of 
social centres for primary assistance and community care.  
 
In the process of policy implementation others criticisms were put forward by 
the social workers and programme managers. Their initial attitude was one of 
general consent. Complaints on the excessive paperwork and bureaucratic 
burden were soon expressed. Likewise, the insufficient material infrastructure 
for the managing of the Rentas Mínimas de Inserción was also criticised. 
Moreover, the universalistic approach of the social services during the 1980s 
was confronted with the targeting criteria towards the needy put forward by the 
programmes of minimum income.  
 
The process of policy implementation also confirmed the institutional leadership 
of the mesogovernments as main actors in the development of the Rentas 
Mínimas de Inserción. This factor was independent, in many cases, of partisan 
alignments. Let us remember, for instance, that the Socialists were in a 
government coalition with the Nationalists of the PNV in the Basque Country. 
They supported the first implemented Renta Mínima despite the reluctance of 
the Socialist Minister for Social Affairs. A similar situation took place in the 
region of Madrid. Thus, no consistent patterns of ideological standings are to be 
deduced from the political behaviour of the party organisations in the various 
institutional arenas of their participation. 
 
The Comunidades Autónomas have followed patterns of mobilisation rooted on 
a self-perceived ‘comparative grievance’: no region wants to be left behind. 
These perceptions have interacted in a conflictive manner with the ‘differential 
fact’ claimed by the Spanish ‘historical nationalities’: Basque Country, Catalonia 
and Galicia. These are more interested in maintaining a ‘differentiated’ degree 
of home rule as compared with the rest of the Spanish Comunidades 
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Autónomas. The combination of these processes has resulted in a de facto 
policy equalisation and in an incentive for policy innovation in those Spanish 
regions which have been traditionally lagging behind the ‘modernised’ ones. 
 
 4.3. Assessment of impacts 
 
Unsystematic data on regional minimum income is an obstacle to know in depth 
the impacts of these programmes in each and everyone of the Comunidades 
Autónomas. However, in recent years the central General Directorate for Social 
Action has been collecting series of basic data (benefits, amounts and budgets) 
from which we can have a picture of the general situation (see Tables 14, 15, 
and 16).45 
 
Information about basic amount for the calculation of minima benefits is a good 
indicator about the protecting intensity of the various regional programmes. As 
reproduced in Table 14, basic amounts for the year 2000 oscillated between a 
monthly payment of 238.9 € in the Canary Islands and 318.6 € in Extremadura 
and Navarre. This corresponded to 48.2% and 64.3% of the legal minimum 
wage, respectively. As percentage of the legal minimum wage, variations range 
from 48.2% to 64.3%, and from 82.9% to 110.6%, as percentage of the mean 
non-contributory pension of the social security (these are prorata gross 
percentages according to monthly payments).  
 
All programmes offered lower amounts to support a life-style which could be 
financed were beneficiaries to be in the formal labour market earning the 
minimum wage, and had a rather similar level of protection as that provided by 
the contributory Social Security. In general such amounts do not reflect wide 
regional disparities, although in order to asses the real protecting intensity 
family and other supplements awarded to cover specific needs should also be 
taken into account, as is the case of the Basque Country (Sanzo, 2002).  
 
Likewise, the total number of households that received minima benefits in the 
year 2000 provides a good indicator of coverage.46 This indicator shows a 
greater degree of disparities: while in the Basque Country benefits were 
received by 2.64% of the total Basque households, percentages of between 1% 
and 1.5% corresponded to Canary Islands, Cantabria, Murcia and Navarre, and 
the rest of the Comunidades Autónomas hardly reached 1% of all households.  
 
                                            
45 Data reproduced was directly facilitated to the General Directorate by the Comunidades 
Autónomas. We should point out that interpretations about these data must be carried out 
cautiously because if in some cases they refer genuinely to minimum income, in some others 
(e.g. Andalusia and Asturias) they include desegregate figures corresponding to benefits for 
socially protected employment or for financing insertion projects. In some other cases figures 
add up the aggregate number of all beneficiaries who have joined the programme in a year (e.g. 
Basque Country), but other programmes take into account the number of beneficiaries in a 
given month (e.g. Madrid).  
46 Current data on their incidence on regional poverty rates are not available, something which 
have prevented us to calculate coverage rates of the targeted population. Further to this, data of 
the General Directorate for Social Action on minimum income beneficiaries are based on 
estimations. Consequently, the option taken has been to calculate coverage rates of 
households in the Comunidades Autónomas.  
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Expenditure figures are also a good measure to assess both regional effort and 
generosity in financing these programmes. Once again, the special fiscal 
arrangement in the Basque Country allowed this Comunidad Autónoma to 
afford up to 1.03% (53,2 million €) in its 2000 Budget for funding the minimum 
income programme. A group of regions including Andalusia, Catalonia and 
Madrid also devote sizeable amount to these programmes. In some others, 
however, the budgetary effort is rather modest: 0.86% in the case of Asturias 
and no more than 0.4% in regions such as Murcia or La Rioja. 
 
Tables 15 and 16 reproduced expenditure patterns and number of beneficiaries 
in the second half of the 1990s. If we compare figures through this period a 
sustained increase is noticeable. On observing annual modifications, however, 
it cannot be inferred a general pattern of change for all of them. Figures of 
expenditure flows and number of beneficiaries do not show a common pattern 
either. (e.g. Basque Country and Murcia). Some authors have contrasted these 
changes with relation to employment rates, demographic transitions and 
institutional variations regarding these programmes (Ayala, 2001).  
 
Variations concerning institutional and political inputs are the ones which most 
condition programmes’ output and outcomes. Throughout the 1990s a process 
of adjustment and consolidation for most programmes took place, which was 
also subject to political volatility. Programmes were implemented for reasons of 
legitimacy by the new mesogovernments in the general process of 
decentralisation in Spain. In the future they could also suffer from a certain 
degree of discretionary politics.  
 
Comparisons between programmes must be carried out according to 
commensurable criteria. On contrasting the impacts made by regional minimum 
income programmes those territorial imbalances and disparities prior to their 
implementation are to be taken into account in the first place. Any evaluative 
exercise must consider the departing situation of the regions regarding their 
relative positions concerning poverty and wealth, citizens’ purchasing power 
and spending capacities. In particular, the maintenance or otherwise of 
traditional practices of family micro-solidarity is to be regarded as a fundamental 
indicator in the fight against poverty in Mediterranean Spain.  
 
The Comunidades Autónomas –and their mesogovernments-- have benefited in 
terms of political legitimisation as a consequence of the implementation of the 
Rentas Mínimas de Inserción. Programmes’ visibility was maximised by the fact 
that, in the beginning of the process of implementation, the financial implications 
of new minimum income schemes were not too dear for the regional treasuries. 
Besides, a clear message of policy innovation and political aggiornamento 
underlined their dynamic commitment to carry out the weaving of ‘safety nets’ of 
social protection in Spain. However, It remains to be seen whether these 
programmes will continue to be a priority for the regions. The Comunidades 
Autónomas may face a not-too-distant future situation of either requesting co-
funding from the central government or containing the coverage scope of their 
benefits. 
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All things considered, the impact of these ab novo programmes of minimum 
income has had a dramatic effect in the debate about the completion of a ‘safety 
net’ in Spain. According to estimates provided by the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Affairs, in 2000 there were 202,221 beneficiaries in the whole of Spain including 
dependent family members (around 0,5% of the Spanish population) (MTAS, 
2001b).  
 
In all future scenarios, the action by the regional and local government will be of 
decisive importance for the sustainability of the system of social protection in 
Spain and, in particular, for the maintenance of effective programmes against 
poverty and social exclusion. Indeed, the three-layer institutional interplay is a 
structuring variable, which pre-determines to a great extent the diverse nature of 
welfare outcomes in contemporary Spain.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The public ‘safety net’ in Spain is fragmented and compounded mainly by 
national and regional benefits for the needy. The contributory realm is the main 
source of income for poor and excluded beneficiaries. But social assistance has 
gained in importance in the last decades. Despite its fragmentation, an 
organising rationale can be identified concerning the whole of policies tackling 
poverty and exclusion in Spain. Of particular interest is the proactive approach 
taken by the Spanish regions, or Comunidades Autónomas, in the 
implementation of new benefits for low-income citizens. 
 
Regions in Spain have fully exercised their constitutional right to home rule in 
the general framework of European subsidiarity. The role played by the Spanish 
mesogovernments of the Comunidades Autónomas in the construction of public 
‘safety nets’ has been crucial in terms of policy innovation, and could be used 
as reference for developments in other Southern European countries.  
 
Nevertheless, future scenarios for the regional programmes are uncertain. If it is 
true that they have been able to integrate social services and social assistance 
policies into a common regionally-based network of provision, the lack of 
financial resources and the ever-latent risk of exacerbating inter-regional 
inequalities in welfare provision is to be underlined. Up until now, the ‘mimesis 
effect’ among the Comunidades Autónomas has proved to be an effective 
barrier against open discrimination amongst them, and a very effective de facto 
equaliser of policy output. 
 
Outcomes of regional polices in the fight against poverty and social exclusion 
need, in any case, to be assessed on a medium-term perspective. Longer time-
series for analyses are, thus, required to validate the Spanish case of welfare 
decentralisation. The one lesson to be drawn from the Spanish experience is 
the attempt to make effective both principles of Europeanisation: territorial 
subsidiarity and democratic accountability.47  
                                            
47 Let us remind that according to the own views of the European Commission, the new 
European governance is not considered the ‘exclusive’ responsibility of European Union 
institutions. Neither national governments nor national parliaments are regarded as being the 
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Despite its institutional demotion (from an institutional status as independent 
Ministry of Social Affairs to an integrated part of a larger Ministry of Labour and 
Social Affairs), ministerial central officials dealing with poverty and social 
exclusion matters took the initiative in the co-ordination of the workings for 
establishing the 2001-03 Spanish NAPSI (National Action Plan for Social 
Inclusion). Problems about its eventual implementation concern mainly its 
financing. All participants involved in the formulation of the Plan put its 
wholehearted support behind it. However, it is not clear whether the central 
government will manage the articulation of ‘fresh’ funds to accomplish the 
estimated increases at rate of an annual 8%.  
 
Some doubts have been cast on whether the role of the Spanish central 
government would be merely that of co-ordinating the aggregation of funds 
already devoted by public and private institutions (profit and non-profit) to 
promote social inclusion. Let us remind that in federalised Spain the task of 
bringing together a wide range of governmental and societal stakeholders 
cannot be simply achieved by displaying a central, top-down, hierarchical 
harmonisation of programmes nation-wide. However, the very existence of the 
NAPSI can be assessed as an important attempt for intergovernmental co-
ordination as it provides the very first synthetic overview of the fight against 
social exclusion in Spain 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                
sole actors of European governance. Local authorities and the regions are regarded as decisive 
emerging actors (Commission, 2000). 
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Table 1: Social Spending Increases as % of GDP, 1984-1997 
 
Total state spending Social spending Unemployment benefits Pensions  
1984 1997 increase 1984 1997 increase 1984 1997 increase 1984 1997 increase 
Liberal             
Australia 36.40 33.20 -3.20 13.8 18.1 4.3 1.37 1.17 -.20 3.28 4.38 1.10 
Canada 45.30 42.40 -2.90 16.2 16.9 0.7 2.03 1.04 -.99 3.35 4.40 1.05 
Ireland 47.70 33.20 -14.50 17.9 17.9 0.0 3.52 2.22 -1.30 4.50 2.89 -1.61 
UK 47.10 40.90 -6.20 21.1 21.6 0.5 1.78 .48 -1.30 5.74 6.43 .69 
USA 33.10 31.40 -1.70 14.1 16.0 1.9 .49 .28 -.21 5.75 5.60 -.15 
Average 41.9 36.2 -5.7 16.6 18.1 1.5 1.8 1.0 -.8 4.5 4.7 .2 
Nordic             
Denmark 62.60 56.80 -5.80 28.9 30.5 1.6 4.95 3.81 -1.14 5.85 6.92 1.07 
Finland 40.20 51.80 11.60 22.3 29.3 7.0 .90 3.19 2.29 6.42 7.55 1.13 
Norway 42.10 44.10 2.00 19.7* 25.4 5.7 .48* .70 .22 4.77* 5.58 .81 
Sweden 59.20 59.00 -.20 30.0 33.3 3.3 .94 2.20 1.26 7.20 8.05 .85 
Average 51.0 52.9 1.9 25.2 29.6 4.4 1.8 2.5 .7 6.1 7.0 1.0 
Corporatist             
Austria 49.30 49.80 .50 24.3* 25.4 1.1 .84* .92 .08 9.47* 10.11 .64 
Belgium 60.70 51.40 -9.30 26.7 23.6 -3.1 3.62 2.67 -.95 6.84 7.44 .60 
France 51.50 52.60 1.10 26.4 29.6 3.2 2.34 1.85 -.49 8.66 10.73 2.07 
Germany 47.40 48.10 .70 23.6 26.6 3.0 1.05 1.49 .44 10.18 10.49 .31 
Netherlands 49.40 50.00 .60 30.2 25.1 -5.1 3.98 3.30 -.68 6.81 6.58 -.23 
Average 52.5 49.3 -3.2 26.2 26.1 -.2 2.4 2.0 -.3 8.4 9.1 .7 
Mediterranean             
Greece 53.80 44.60 -9.20 16.9 22.2 5.3 .35 .50 .15 7.70 9.39 1.69 
Italy 43.10 50.40 7.30 21.0 26.8 5.8 1.39 .79 -.60 8.90 13.24 4.34 
Portugal 41.10 43.50 2.40 11.4 18.7 7.3 .27 .87 .60 3.78 6.54 2.76 
Spain  35.20 39.90 4.70 17.8 20.9 3.1 2.25 1.89 -.36 5.81 8.60 2.79 
Average 42.2 46.0 3.8 16.8 22.2 5.4 1.1 10 -.1 6.5 9.4 2.9 
Japan 32.30 35.00 2.70 11.4 14.4 3.0 .52 .54 .02 3.65 5.50 1.85 
Average 46.2 45.2 -1.00 20.7 23.3 2.6 1.7 1.6 -.2 6.2 7.4 1.1 
Note: *1985 data: 1984 unavailable. Countries are divided up into a conventional regime categorisation.  
Source: cols. 2-7: Castles, 2001, updated by OECD 2001.  
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Table 2: The public support to welfare in Spain (1985-1995) (%)  
 
 
 1985 1986 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
The State is responsible of the welfare of each 
and every one of the Spanish citizens and has 
the duty to help them to solve their problems 
 
68 
 
64 
 
67 
 
58 
 
59 
 
55 
 
58 
 
61 
 
60 
 
62 
The State is only responsible for the welfare of 
the least-favoured citizens and has the duty to 
help them to solve their problems. 
 
-* 
 
-* 
 
-* 
 
21 
 
17 
 
19 
 
17 
 
18 
 
18 
 
15 
The citizens are responsible themselves for 
their own well-being and have the duty to sort 
out their own problems. 
 
18 
 
21 
 
20 
 
5 
 
16 
 
18 
 
18 
 
16 
 
16 
 
16 
Don’t knows/ No answer 13 15 13 16 8 8 7 5 11 8 
 
 
Note: * This option was not included in the questionnaire. 
 
 
Source: Del Pino, E (2001). Elaboration from CIS (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, Spanish Sociological Research Centre): 
Estudios: no. 1465 (1985), no 1535 (1986), no. 1 752 (1988), no. 1849 (1989), nos. 1880 & 1910 (1.990), no. 1971 (1.991), no. 
2.017 (1992), no. 2063 (1.993), no. 2111 (1994), no. 2154 & 2187 (1.995 (CIS).  
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Table 3: Territorial Distribution of Public Expenditure in Spain (%) 
 
 19811 1984 1987 1990 1992 1997 20002 
CENTRAL 87.3 75.6 72.6 66.2 63.0 59.5 54 
REGIONAL 3.0 12.2 14.6 20.5 23.2 26.9 33 
LOCAL 9.7 12.1 12.8 13.3 13.8 13.6 13 
 
1 Beginning of the process of devolution 
2 Government’s estimates 
 
Source: Spanish Ministry of Public Administrations (MAP, 1997). 
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Table 4: Primary institutions of reference by least-favoured families  
(according to type of poverty) (%) 
 
 Extreme Grave Moderate Precarious
Comunidades 
Autónomas 
12.2 14.8 13.8 13.8 
Municipalities 33.0 31.3 35.3 39.5 
Red Cross 30.0 29.2 24.8 21.0 
Caritas 22.8 22.5 22.3 20.6 
Others 2.0 2.2 3.8 5.1 
Total 100 100 100 100 
 
Note: Diverse types of poverty are defined according to income percentages regarding the average national disposable income: 
extreme, lower than 15%; grave, between 16% and 25%; moderate, from 26% to 35%; precarious, between 36% and 50%. 
 
Source: EDIS et al., 1998. 
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Table 5: Poor population in Spain 
 
Variable of reference Year 2000 Sources/Observations 
Population: 
Poor citizens  
7,265,008 ECHP 1996 (60% of the income mean). 
Targeted population: 
1. Extreme poor (under 15% of 
the total average income)  
528,200 FOESSA, Madrid, 1998. 
2. Households in dire straits to 
reach the end of the month 
1,908,800 ECHP 1996 
Covered population: 
1. Beneficiaries of regional 
Rentas Mínimas de Inserción  
202,000 MTAS, according to information by Comunidades 
Autónomas 
2. Beneficiaries of Contributory 
Supplementary Benefits 
2,401,000 Report by Secretary of State for Social Security, 
2001. 
3. Beneficiaries of non-
contributory pensions 
476,202 Report by Secretary of State for Social Security, 
2001. 
 
Source: MTAS, 2001a, p. 22. 
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Table 6: Territorial distribution of poverty in Spain* 
 
 Share of total population 
Share of total 
poor 
population 
Difference 
total-poor 
population  
Difference  
in percentage 
 
Andalusia 17.9 24.4 +6.5 +36.3
Aragon 3.0 3.1 +0.1 +3.3
Asturias 2.8 2.1 -0.7 -25.0
Balearics 1.8 1.5 -0.3 -16.6
Basque 
Country 
5.4 3.1 -2.3 -42.5
Canaries 3.8 4.6 +0.8 +21.0
Cantabria 1.3 1.1 -0.2 -15.3
Castille-La 
Mancha 
4.2 6.0 +1.8 +42.8
Castille and 
Leon 
6.6 7.6 +1.0 +15.1
Catalonia 15.6 11.3 -4.3 -27.5
Extremadura 2.8 5.6 +2.8 +100.0
Galicia 7.1 6.8 -0.3 -4.2
La Rioja 0.6 0.5 -0.1 -16.6
Madrid 12.6 6.4 -6.2 -49.2
Murcia 2.6 3.7 +1.1 +42.3
Navarre 1.3 0.7 -0.6 -46.1
Valencia 10.0 11.0 +1.0 +10.0
 
* According to EPF data (Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares, 1991). 
  
Source: EDIS et al., 1998, p.170. 
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Table 7: Poverty rates in Spain (ECHP 1994-1996) 
 
1994 1995 1996 
Monthly equivalised income* mean 436.46€ 448.58€ 496.93€ 
Threshold: 50% 18% 17.6% 17.5% 
Threshold: 25% 2.6% 3% 2.7% 
Monthly equivalised income median 360.61€ 375.63€ 413.64€ 
Threshold: 60% 17.8% 17.7% 17.5% 
Threshold: 25% 1.6% 1.9% 1.5% 
 
 
* Equivalised income is the disposable income adjusted, using equivalence 
scales, to allow comparison between different types of income units. 
Source: Elaboration on ECHP data (1994, 1995, 1996) by García Serrano, 
Malo and Toharia (2001) 
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Table 8: Poverty rates by individual and household characteristics ECHP 
1996 
 Poverty risk by 
groups %  
% Poor Population  
(Distribution by 
individual and 
household character.) 
%Total Population 
(Distribution by 
individual and 
household character.) 
Sex of individual 
 Male 17.5 48 
48
 Female 17.6 52 52
Age of individual 
 16-24 24.4 22,9 16,5
 25-34 16.6 18,2 19,2
 35-44 17.5 17,3 17,2
 45-54 20.1 16,2 14,1
 55-64 18.4 13,8 13,2
 ≥65 10.2 11,6 19,8
Marital status 
 Married 17.0 58,1 60,1
 
Separated/Divorced 24.9 2,5 1,7
 
Widow 10.6 4,9 8,1
 
Single 20.1 34,5 30,1
Educational level 
 High 5.9 4,7 14,1
 Middle 12.3 13,1 18,6
 Low 21.4 82,1 67,2
Household size 
 1 4.2 1,2 4,9
 2 10.6 10,2 16,9
 3 14.7 18,3 21,9
 4 16.2 26,9 29,0
 5 26.4 25,5 16,9
 ≥6 30.6 17,9 19,4
Household type 
 Single16-64 7.9 0,7 1,5
 Single≥65 2.7 0,5 3,5
 Couple no child. <65  13.8 5,0 6,3
 Couple no child. ≥65 7.9 4,7 10,3
 Other no child. 15.4 21,7 24,6
 Single with child. 24.7 1,2 0,9
 Couple 1-2 child. 14.5 18,5 22,5
 Couple ≥3 child. 32.2 6,8 3,7
 Other with dep. child. 27 35,7 23,2
Labour market position 
 Working 11.7 26,0 39,1
 Unemployed 38.3 24,2 11,1
 Inactive 17.5 49,8 49,8
Workers by form of employment 
 Wage earner /salaried worker 8.6 55,8 75,6
 Trainee 26 2,9 1,3
 Self-employed 20 36,3 20,9
 Working with family 27 5,0 2,2
Working day (working population) 
 1-14 hours 20.5 4,6 2,6
 15-29 hours 14.8 8,4 6,5
 ≥30 hours 11.0 87,0 90,9
Main household incomes 1995 
 Wage and salary 13.3 41,5 54,6
 Self-employed 21.7 13,4 10,8
 Pension 14.3 19,4 23,7
 Unemployment subsidy 64.4 10,4 2,8
 Other social benefits 36.6 11,2 5,3
 Capital gain 20.7 1,9 1,6
Source: Elaboration from García Serrano, Malo and Toharia, (2001) Data ECHP 1994, 1995, 1996 
Note: Poverty threshold: 50% mean of monthly equivalised income : 496.93 € 
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Table 9: Amount of minimum income schemes and other ‘safety net’ benefits, minimum wage and income tax 
individual/family minimum, 2000 (€ per person/month)* 
Income tax:  
Personal/family minimum (2) 
Contributory minimum 
pensions 
Comunidades  
Autónomas   
(year and month of 
implementation) 
Renta 
mínima 
(1) 
Minimum 
wage 
Individual 
Minimum 
Family  
minimum (3) 
Unemploy
ment  
contributor
y benefit 
Unemploy
ment non-
contributor
y benefit 
S.G.I.M. & 
assistance 
pensions 
Benefits per 
dependent 
child 
Minimum 
S.O.V.I. 
pensions With 
spouse 
Without 
spouse 
 
Andalusia  
 
263.4 
 
Aragon  
 
254.8 
 
Asturias  
 
282.3 
 
Balearics  
 
282.1 
 
Basque Country 
 
305.4 
 
Canaries 
 
238.9 
 
Cantabria  
 
249.4 
 
Castille-La Mancha  
 
297.5 
 
Castille and Leon 
 
260.3 
 
Catalonia  
 
285.5 
 
Extremadura  
 
318.6 
 
Galicia  
 
242.0 
 
La Rioja  
 
298.1 
 
Madrid  
 
249.0 
 
Murcia  
 
240.4 
 
Navarre  
 
318.6 
 
Valencia  
 
298.0 
427.79 
(14 times 
per year)
 
 
5,947.13 
per year 
(14 
times) 
3,305.56  
per year 
 
3,906.57  
per year  
<65 years 
 
5,108.60  
per year 
disability 
between 
33% and 
65% 
 
6,911.63  
per year 
disability 
equal to or 
higher than 
65% 
 
5,409.10 
single-parent 
family 
<65 years 
 
6,010.12  
single-parent 
family  
<65 years 
 
7,212.14 
disability 
between 33% 
and 65% 
9,015.18 
disability 
equal to or 
higher than 
65% 
601.01  
 Per year  
Head 
 <65 years 
and income 
<Minimum 
wage  
1,202.02  
per year  
1st & 2nd 
child 
 
 
1,803.03 
 per year  
3º and 
successive 
children 
 
 
150,25 
supplement 
for school 
material 
between 3 
and 16 years 
 
300.50  
supplement 
for each 
descendent 
<3 years 
 
1,803.03 
disability 33% 
and 65% 
3,606.07 
disability 
equal/higher  
65% 
369.53 (4) 
Bottom 
threshold: 
1. Without 
children: 
(75% 
minimum 
wage + 
1/6= 
495.59 x 
75= 
371.69) 
 
 
495.59 
2 With 
children: 
(minimum 
wage + 
1/6= 
424.79 + 
70.79= 
495.58) 
318.71 
75% 
Minimum 
wage = 
75% de 
424.79 
 
Agrarian 
unemploym
ent 
Subsidy for 
temporary  
 
10.61 
per day 
(10.61 x 
30= 
318.30) 
(75% of 
Minimum 
wage per 
day) 
149.83 
for the 
Subsidy for 
Guaranteei
ng 
Minimum 
Income 
(S.G.I.M.), 
disabled 
according 
to LISMI 
Act 
(phasing 
out)  
234.75 
1. Disability 
higher than 
65% and 18 
years or older 
 
352.13 
2. Disability 
equal/higher 
75% and 18 
years or older
 
48.08 
3. Younger 
than 18 years 
and disability 
of 33% 
 
24.25 
4. No 
disability and 
older than 18 
years 
254.82 
(14 
payment
s) SOVI 
– 
Disability 
and Old-
age 
Obligator
y 
Insuranc
e  
 
(3,564 
per year)
Retirement 
65 years: 
424.61 
 
Disability: 
Major 
Invalidity: 
639,92 
(4.27%) 
 
Absolute:  
424.61 
 
Total with 
65 years: 
424.61 
 
Single: 
Absolute 
orphan 
353.75 
 
 
All 
amounts in 
14 
payments 
per year 
(with or 
without 
dependent 
spouse)  
Retirement 
65 years: 
360.24 
 
Disability: 
Major:  
540.82 
 
Absolute: 
360.54 
 
Total with 65 
years 
360.54 
 
Widows 65 
years:  
360.54 
 
60-64 years: 
316.94 
 
>60 years: 
252.90 
 
Orphans: 
104.30 (5) 
 
To relatives 
in charge: 
104.30 (5)  
 
With 65 
years:  
268.59 (6) 
 
>65 years 
252.90 (6) 
(1) Basic amount (2) Established by Income Tax Law 40/1998 (3) Provided that income is not higher than the minimum threshold established of 6,010,12 exempted the 
amounts regulated in art. 48 of the Income Tax normative (4) It refers to the minimum which could be perceived  (5) Per beneficiary (6) One beneficiary.  
* Source: Elaboration from CES, 2001, p.66 and administrative data from DGASMF of MTAS. 
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Table 10: Low-income cash benefits (non-contributory) 
 
 
 
 
 
Monthly amount 
(annual amount 
apportioned in 12 
payments) 
€/month 
% MW/monthly 
MW (year 2000)=  495.5 €/month 
(annual amount apportioned in 12 
payments) 
 
Beneficiaries
 
Notes 
Minimum contributory 
pensions supplement 
(Minimum pension) 
 
 
 
429.33 
 
 
 
86.6 
 
 
2,402,321 
 
Referred to the contributory minimum 
pension WITHOUT spouse and >65 
years 
Beneficiaries up to 31/12/2000: 31,4% 
of pensions  
Unemployment subsidy 318.60 64.3 367,851  
Agrarian unemployment 
subsidy 318.60 64.3 224,170 
 
Active income for 
occupational insertion 318.60 64.3 3,966 Maximum: 10 payments 
Assistance pensions 174.83 35.3 68,058 
‘Frozen’ amount since 1991  
(phasing out) 
Beneficiaries: data from the Basque 
Country unavailable 
Minimum income guarantee 
(disability-LISMI) 174.83 35.3 83,471 
‘Frozen’ amount since 1991  
(phasing out) 
Beneficiaries: data from the Basque 
Country and Navarre unavailable 
Non-contributory pensions 
for disabled and old-age  288.10 58.1 471,275  
Differences in regional 
minimum income schemes 
Maximum:     318.60 
Minimum:        238.92 
Maximum:     64.3 
Minimum:     48.2 78,445* *Number of households 
Source: Elaboration from MTAS (2001b) and data provided by General Directorate for Social Action, Minors and Family (Dirección General de Acción Social, 
del Menor y de la Familia). 
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Table11: Cash benefits for family protection (2000)  
 
 
 
Benefits per 
dependent child 
 
Annual 
amount 
Monthly 
amount (12 
payments) 
% MW (495.5 €/month, (annual 
amount apportioned in 12 
payments) 
No disability and 
younger than 18 years 
291.01 24.25 4.9
Younger than 18 years 
and disability > 33% 
582.20 48.47 9.8
Older than 18 years 
and disability > 65% 
2,817.06 234.76 47.4
Older than 18 years 
and disability > 75% 
4,255.65 352.13 71.1
Third child birth 450.76 ----- -----
Maximum Income for 
family protection 
7439.92 (+ 
15% per year 
2nd and 
successive 
children) 
619.99 125.1
 
Source: Elaboration from MTAS (2001b) 
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Table X: Main features of “Safety net” benefits (2000)  
 
 Contributory Access 
BENEFITS Access Means test Length Administrative agency Activation measures Estimated amount Requirements for Beneficiaries 
Minimum pensions 
supplements Contributory  
Maximum:  
individual 
incomes 
Indefinite 
INSS 
(Social Security 
National Institute) 
(Centrally-run) 
----- 
Differential amount up to the 
minimum pension (yearly fixed 
according to age, family situation 
and kind of pension)  
Pensioners whose basic pension is lower 
than the minimum 
Income lower than the maximum amount 
(fixed yearly) 
Total amount 
Affiliated workers and pensioners 
Child with no disability and younger than 18 
years 
Income lower than the fixed amount yearly 
(+15% for the 2nd child and successive) <18 
years 
Maximum for 
household ----- 
Reduced amount (differential) 
Affiliated workers and pensioners 
Child with no disability and younger than 18 
years 
Income lower than the maximum amount 
(yearly fixed) + benefit 
Family 
protection 
supplements 
Disability 
Contributory 
No access to a 
non-contributory 
pension 
Indefinite while access 
conditions remain INSS 
----- Total amount 
Affiliated workers and pensioners 
Disabled children without access to non-
contributory pensions or assistance 
pensions 
Unemployment 
subsidy 
Contributory 
 
Maximum for 
household 
 
Variable depending on 
the contribution, age 
and family charges 
INEM 
(Employment 
National Institute) 
(Management 
transferred to 
regions) 
Conditions:  
Do not refuse right job 
offers neither training or 
labour restructuring 
programmes 
 
Total amount 
Unemployed person (1 month registered) 
Do not refuse job offers or training, labour 
promotion or restructuring programmes 
Exhausted benefit or insufficient 
contribution and other situations  
Low-incomes 
Contribution: 3 months+family resp.; 6 
months; +52 years with access to cont. 
pension +6 years of contributions 
Older than 45 with exhausted benefit 
Agrarian 
unemployment subsidy
(Andalusia and 
Extremadura) 
Contributory Maximum for household 
Variable depending on 
the contribution, age 
and family charges 
INEM 
Conditions: 
It depends on ages (16, 
25, 52 and 60 years), 
access, amounts and 
length 
Total amount 
Unemployed people 
Eventual employee registered in the 
REASS, Andalusia and Extremadura 
Low-incomes 
Contribution: minimum number of working 
days (35); +52 years with access to cont. 
pension +6 years of contributions 
INEM Active income Contributory Maximum for household  10 months 
INEM-CCAA 
(Regional 
Autonomous 
Communities) 
Labour insertion 
programme and workfare 
commitment 
Total amount 
Long-term unemployed people (12 months) 
≥45 years 
Family responsibility 
Low-incomes 
End of the contributory benefit 
Signing of workfare commitment (benefit is 
provided 3 months later) 
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BENEFITS Access Means test Length Administrative agency Activation measures Estimated amount Requirements for Beneficiaries 
Assistance pensions 
(disappearing) 
 
Non-  
contributory 
 
Maximum for 
household Indefinite CCAA ----- Total amount 
Disabled and old-age 
≥66 years 
Helplessness 
Income lower than the benefit and no 
property 
Minimum income 
guarantee (disability-
LISMI) 
(disappearing) 
Non-
contributory 
Maximum:  
individual 
incomes 
Indefinite 
IMSERSO-CCAA 
(Institute of 
Migrations and 
Social Services ) 
(Management 
transferred to 
regions) 
----- Differential amount Disability Personal income lower than 70% MW  
Invalidity: 18-64 years, ≥65% disability, low-
incomes 
Non-contributory 
pensions for disabled 
and old-age  
Non- 
contributory 
Maximum for 
household Indefinite IMSERSO-CCAA ----- 
Differential amount between 
incomes or beneficiary 
benefits/household and the 2nd 
beneficiary pension and 
successive: 70% 
Minimum: 25% of the pension Retirement: 65 years, insufficient incomes 
Total amount 
Child with no disability and younger than 18 
years 
Income lower than the fixed amount yearly 
(+15% for the 2nd child and successive) <18 
years  
Maximum for 
household ----- 
Reduced amount (differential) 
Child with no disability and younger than 18 
years 
Income lower than the maximum amount 
(yearly fixed) + benefit 
Non-
contributory 
family 
protection 
Disability
Non- 
contributory 
No access to a 
non-contributory 
pension 
Indefinite while access 
conditions exist INSS 
----- Total amount 
Affiliated workers and pensioners 
Disabled children without access to non-
contributory pensions or assistance 
pensions 
Minimum income 
schemes of the 
Autonomous 
Communities 
Non- 
contributory 
Maximum for 
household 
Variable depending on 
the autonomous 
legislation 
CCAA 
Commitments and social 
and labour insertion 
programmes 
Differential amount Variable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Social Assistance 
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Figure 1: The Spanish public ‘safety net’: scale and itineraries of protection  
 
 
Contributory level 
 
 
Access from Contributory level 
 
 
 
 
Non-Contributory Social Assistance 
 
Insufficient
No Contribution
≥ 65 years 
± 65% Disability
Sufficient 
Contribution 
Minimun Contributory  
Pensions Supplement 
< 65 years 
Unemployment Subsidy 
Agrarian 
Unemployment Subsidy
Active Income 
for Insertion
> 65 years 
< 65 years 
± 65% Disability 
Minimum Income Schemes 
> 45 years
< 45 years
< 65 years 
> 65 years 
± 65% Disability
0-64% Disability
0-64% Disability
Contributory 
0-64% Disability
Non-Contributory Pensions 
Assistance pensions / MIG(LISMI) 
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Table 13: Estimates of the Spanish NAPSI (NAP/incl.) (€ million ) 
 
Objective/Area of action Year 2000 
Million of Euro 
Years 2001-2003 
(**) 
Million of Euro 
Objective 1.1.: 957.09 2,896.93 
* Access to employment 957.09 2,896.93 
Objective 1.2.: 9,408.60 19,470.59 
* Benefits resources 6,236.29 12,699.16 
* Social Services (primary) 548.24 1,203.16 
* Access to housing 446.76 922.41 
* Education 1,103.86 2.340.17 
* Health 1,073.46 2.305.69 
Objective 2: 526.36 1,136.45 
* Support family solidarity 513.74 1,109.67 
* Access to new technologies 12.62 26.78 
Objective 3: 866.25 1,809.90 
* Elderly 178.27 375.48 
* Women 61.33 126.63 
* Youth 41.96 85.92 
* Children and family 189.34 401.58 
* Gypsy population 9.14 18.38 
* Disabled 176.05 369.59 
* Homeless 6,98 14.03 
* Immigrants 200.06 412.36 
* Former inmates 3.13 5.92 
Objective 4: 51.93 110.30 
* Mobilisation of agents and 
partners 
51.93 110.30 
TOTAL 11,810.23 25,424.16 
 
(*) Estimates according to information provided by public institutions and 
supporting bodies.  
 
(**) Note that the estimates for 2001-03 are biannual (i.e. the aggregation of 
both 2001 and 2002 financial years). 
 
Source: MTAS, 2001a: 48. 
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Table 14: Regional expenditure and coverage of the programmes of minimum 
income schemes, 2000 
 
 Regional 
Expenditure 
Population coverage Protective Intensity 
 Actual 
spending 
(million 
of €)1 
% 
Budgetary 
effort 2 
Number of 
houselholds3
% of 
households4
 Basic 
Amount5 
(€/month) 
% 
M.W. 
6 
% 
N.C.P.7
Andalusia 27,532 0.17 15,962 0.74 263.4 53.1 91.4
Aragon 2.596 0.12 1,396 0.36 254.8 51.4 88.5
Asturias 10.632 0.86 1,512 0.44 282.3 57.0 98.0
Balearics 1.082 0.12 570 0.21 282.1 56.9 97.9
Basque 
Country 
53.238 1.03 16,550 2.64 305.4 61.6 106.0
Canaries 8.024 0.21 5,358 1.12 238.9 48.2 82.9
Cantabria 3.456 0.39 2,340 1.43 249.4 50.3 86.6
Castille-La 
Mancha 
1.947 0.07 813 0.15 297.5 60.0 103.3
Castille and 
Leon 
8.763 0.20 2,814 0.34 260.3 52.5 90.3
Catalonia 36.632 0.28 9,726 0.47 285.5 57.6 99.1
Extremadura 3.119 0.18 1,351 0.40 318.6 64.3 110.6
Galicia 12.699 0.20 4,156 0.51 242.0 48.8 84.0
La Rioja 0.337 0.08 179 0.22 289.1 58.3 100.3
Madrid 24.912 0.38 7,855 0.49 249.0 50.2 86.4
Murcia 0.950 0.06 3,478 1.02 240.4 48.5 83.4
Navarre 4.075 0.19 1,820 1.04 318.6 64.3 110.6
Valencia 10.019 0.14 2,565 0.20 298.0 60.1 103.4
 
Source: Elaboration from data provided by the General Directorate for Social Action, Minors and 
Family (Dirección General de Acción Social, del Menor y de la Familia).  
 
Note: Budget expenditure amount corresponds to the expenditure of the minimum income 
payments, except for Asturias which also includes social wage expenditure and training.  
 
1 Spending data corresponds to the Budget related to minimum income benefit payments. 
2 Percentage of Expenditure related to Minimum Income Schemes/Initial consolidated Budget of 
the CCAA, Ministry of Public Administration (http://www.map.es) 
3 The number of households corresponds to the number of benefits. In some cases, data 
corresponds to the number of households with access to the programme at any moment (ex. 
during December in Madrid), in some others, data corresponds to the number of households 
with access to the benefits throughout the year (ex. Basque Country). 
4 Total number of households of the Autonomous Communities comes from the Continuous 
Survey on Family Budgets, 2nd Trimester, 2001, INE.  
5 Basic amount corresponds to the basic amount which comes out of adding family supplements 
(depending on family size and on each CCAA) and of subtracting the incomes received by the 
family. 
6 Percentage of the basic amount of the minimum income with regard to the Minimum wage, 
2000: 495.5 €/month (annual amount apportioned in 12 payments) 
7 Percentage of the basic amount of the minimum income with regard to Non-Contributory 
pensions for Disability and Old-Age, year 2000: 288.10 (for 12 months: annual amount 
apportioned in 14 payments) . 
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Table 15: Evolution of expenditure on minimum income schemes 
 
 
 
Actual spending  
(million of €) 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Andalusia      24,431 11,756      17,760      17,760       27,532 
Aragon 2,885 2,843       2,614       2,560        2,596 
Asturias  8,072 9,129       9,857       9,568       10,632 
Balearics --   -       1,587       0,974        1,082 
Basque Country 41,320 42,437      42,197      44,817       53,238 
Canaries 7,212 6,653       6,888       8,186        8,024 
Cantabria 445  1.833       2.831       3.780        3.456 
Castille-La Mancha 4,375  2,416       2,777       2,476        1,947 
Castille and Leon 8,132  8,198       8,114       8,468        8,763 
Catalonia 25,531  30,297      34,143       34,143       36,632 
Extremadura 1,262   908       3.666       2,386        3,119 
Galicia 9.604   10.578      11,696      13,150       12,699 
Rioja 319    343       379       325        337 
Madrid 20,777   22,832      24,936      24,966       24,912 
Murcia 1,346    1,160       1,004       0,962        950 
Navarre 2,458  2,747       3,005       3,486        4,075 
Valencia 6,924     7,633       9,226      10,115       10,019 
TOTAL 165,092 161,762 182,678 188,123 210,012
 
Source: Elaboration from data provided by the General Directorate for Social 
Action, Minors and Family (Dirección General de Acción Social, del Menor y de 
la Familia). 
 
Note: Budget expenditure amount corresponds to the expenditure of the 
minimum income payments, except for Asturias which also includes social wage 
expenditure and training. 
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Table 16: Evolution of beneficiaries on minimum income schemes 
(households) 
 
 
 
Number of households 
 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Andalusia 10,603 7,907 7,284 9,914 15,962 
Aragon 1,112 951 793 968 1,396 
Asturias  1,511 1,761 1,067 1,022 1,512 
Balearics  758 604 570 
Basque Country 16,052 16,472 16,190 15,804 16,550 
Canaries 3,096 3,153 5,690 6,689 5,358 
Cantabria 490 320 1491 2,173 2,340 
Castille-La Mancha 2,116 1,619 1,027 920 813 
Castille and Leon 3,306 3,052 2,957 2,937 2,814 
Catalonia 8,372 9,678 9,677 9,672 9,726 
Extremadura 671 443 2365 946 1,351 
Galicia 5,003 5,353 5,647 4,292 4,156 
Madrid 7,815 7,878 8,934 8,304 7,855 
Murcia 532 571 379 327 3,478 
Navarre 1,503 1,646 1,770 1,264 1,820 
Rioja 282 266 233 197 179 
Valencia 3,713 2,644 4,404 3,470 2,565 
TOTAL 66,177 63,714 70,666 69,503 78,445 
 
Source: Elaboration from data provided by the General Directorate for Social 
Action, Minors and Family (Dirección General de Acción Social, del Menor y de 
la Familia).  
 
Note: The number of households in the Programme corresponds to the number 
of households with access to minimum income schemes except for Asturias 
which also includes social employment expenditure and training and Andalusia 
(year 1996) which includes training. 
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Appendix I. National Legislation on benefits for the low-income 
 
 
1962 Decree No. 1315/1962 of June 14 on Assistance for Elderly and 
Disabled people (assistance pensions). 
Decreto 1315/1962, de 14 de junio, de Auxilios a Ancianos y 
Enfermos (pensiones asistenciales). 
 
 
 
Assistance Pensions 
1963 Law No. 163/1963 of December 23, Basic Law of the Social Security 
(in force since 1967). 
Ley 163/1963, de 23 de diciembre, de Bases de la Seguridad Social 
(en vigor a partir de 1967). 
 
 
Social Security (S.S.) 
Regulation 
1972 Law No. 24/1972, June 21, on the Social Security Benefits. 
Ley 24/1972, de 21 de junio, en materia de Prestaciones de la 
Seguridad Social (BOE de 28 de junio). 
 
 
Contributive 
Pensions (S.S.) 
1974 Decree No. 2065/1974, May 30, General Law of Social Security. 
Decreto 2065/1974, de 30 de mayo, por el que se aprueba el Texto 
Refundido de la Ley General de la Seguridad Social (BOE de 20 y 22 
de julio). 
 
 
Social Security 
Regulation 
1978 Spanish Constitution, 27th of December. 
Constitución española, de 27 de diciembre (BOE de 29 de diciembre). 
 
Decree-Law No. 36/1978, November 16, on Social Security 
Management, Health and Employment. 
Real Decreto-Ley 36/1978, de 16 de noviembre, sobre Gestión 
Institucional de la Seguridad Social, la Salud y el Empleo (BOE de 18 
de noviembre). 
 
 
 
 
 
Social Security 
Management  
1980 Law No. 51/1980, October 8, Basic Employment Law. 
Ley 51/1980, de 8 de octubre, Ley Básica de Empleo (BOE de 17 de 
octubre). 
 
Employment 
(including 
Unemployment 
Benefits)  
1981 Decree No. 2620/1981, July 24, on Economic aid Management from 
the National Fund of Social Assistance for old-age, disabled or invalid 
people incapacitated for work. 
Real Decreto 2620/1981, de 24 de julio, por el que se regula la 
Concesión de Ayudas del Fondo Nacional de Asistencia Social a 
ancianos y a enfermos o inválidos incapacitados para el trabajo. (BOE 
de 6 de noviembre). 
 
 
 
Assistance Pensions 
1982 Law No. 13/1982, April 7, on Social Integration of Disabled People. 
Ley 13/1982, de 7 de abril, Ley de Integración Social de Minusválidos 
(LISMI) (BOE de 30 de abril).  
 
Beginning of the National Act of Social Services: 
- Basque Country: Law 6/1982, May 20, on Social Security. 
Comienzo de Leyes Autonómicas de Servicios Sociales:  
- País Vasco: Ley 6/1982, de 20 de mayo, sobre Seguridad Social 
(BOPV, 2 de junio). 
 
Disable People 
Policies (including 
Minimum Guaranteed 
Income) 
 
Regional Social 
Services 
1983 Decree No. 3237/1983, December 28, on Unemployment subsidy for 
eventual employees registered in the Special Agrarian Regime of the 
Social Security. 
Real Decreto 3237/1983, de 28 de diciembre, de subsidio por 
desempleo en favor de los trabajadores eventuales incluidos en el 
Régimen Especial Agrario de la Seguridad Social. 
 
Agrarian 
Unemployment 
Subsidy 
1984 Law No. 31/1984, August 2, on Unemployment Protection. 
Ley 31/1984, de 2 de agosto, de Protección por Desempleo (BOE de 
Unemployment 
Benefits 
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4 de agosto). 
 
Decree No. 383/1984, February 1, on Special System of social and 
economic Benefits for Disabled People. 
Real Decreto 383/1984, de 1 de febrero, de Sistema especial de 
Prestaciones sociales y económicas para Minusválidos (BOE de 22 
de marzo). 
 
Decree  No. 2298/1984, December 26, modifying the Decree 
3237/1883. 
Real Decreto 2298/1984, de 26 de diciembre, modificación del Real 
Decreto 3237/1983. 
 
(Contributory and 
Subsidy) 
Minimum Income 
Guarantee (LISMI) 
 
 
 
 
Agrarian 
Unemployment 
Subsidy 
1985 Law No. 7/1985, April 2, on the regulation of the Local Government 
rules. 
Ley 7/1985, de 2 de abril, reguladora de las bases de Régimen local 
(BOE de 3 de abril). 
 
Decree No. 625/1985, April 2, implementing Law 31/1984, August 2, 
on Unemployment Protection. 
Real Decreto 625/1985, de 2 de abril, que desarrolla la Ley 31/1984, 
de 2 de agosto, de Protección por Desempleo (BOE de 7 de mayo).  
 
Local Administration 
 
 
 
 
Unemployment 
(Contributory and 
Subsidy) 
1986 Law No. 14/1986, April 25, General Law of Health. 
Ley 14/1986, de 25 de abril, General de Sanidad (BOE de 29 de 
abril). 
 
Health System 
1987 Concerted plan for the development of the basic provision of social 
services by the Local Authorities. 
Plan Concertado para el desarrollo de prestaciones básicas de 
servicios sociales de las Corporaciones Locales. 
 
Social Services 
 
1989 Decree No. 1088/1989, September 8, Social Security health care 
coverage extension to people with insufficient incomes. 
Real Decreto 1088/1989, de 8 de septiembre, por el que se extiende 
la cobertura de la asistencia sanitaria de la Seguridad Social a 
personas sin recursos económicos suficientes (BOE de 9 de 
septiembre). 
 
Health Care 
Universalization 
1990 Law No. 26/1990, September 20, Law of Non-Contributory Benefits of 
the Social Security (at present, it is abolished and integrated in the 
General Law of the Social Security, approved by Legislative Decree 
No. 1/1994, June 2). 
Ley 26/1990, de 20 de diciembre, por la que se establecen en la 
Seguridad Social prestaciones no contributivas (actualmente 
derogada e integrada en el Texto Refundido de la Ley General de la 
Seguridad Social, aprobado por Real Decreto Legislativo 1/1994, de 
20 de junio) (BOE de 22 de diciembre). 
 
Non-Contributory 
Pensions (S.S.) and 
Non-Contributory 
Family Protection 
(S.S.) 
1991 Decree No. 356/1991, March 15, on benefits for dependent children, 
implementing Law 26/1990, December 20, Law of Non-Contributory 
Benefits.  
Real Decreto 356/1991, de 15 de marzo, por el que se desarrolla, en 
materia de prestaciones por hijo a cargo, la Ley 26/1990, de 20 de 
diciembre, por la que se establecen en la Seguridad Social 
prestaciones no contributivas, (BOE de 21 de marzo). 
 
 
Decree No. 357/1991, March 15, on non-contributory pensions, 
invalidity and retirement, implementing Law 26/1990, December 20, 
Law of Non-Contributory Benefits. 
Real Decreto 357/1991, de 15 de marzo, por el que se desarrolla, en 
materia de pensiones no contributivas, invalidez y jubilación, la Ley 
Non-Contributory 
Family Protection 
(S.S.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Non-Contributory 
Pensions (S.S.) 
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26/1990, de 20 de diciembre, por la que se establecen en la 
Seguridad Social prestaciones no contributivas (BOE de 21 de 
marzo). 
1992 Law No. 22/1992, July 39, on Urgent Measures for Employment 
Promotion and Unemployment Protection. 
Ley 22/1992, de 30 de julio, de Medidas urgentes sobre Fomento del 
Empleo y Protección por Desempleo (BOE de 4 de agosto). 
 
Law No. 28/1992, November 24, on Urgent Budget Measures, it 
abolishes decree 1315/1962, on assistance pensions.  
Ley 28/1992, de 24 de noviembre, de Medidas Presupuestarias 
Urgentes, que deroga las pensiones asistenciales del Decreto 
1315/1962 (BOE de 25 de noviembre). 
 
Unemployment 
Benefits 
(Contributory and 
Subsidy)  
1994 Legislative Decree No. 1/1994, June 20, General Law of the Social 
Security. 
Real Decreto Legislativo 1/1994, de 20 de junio, por el que se 
aprueba el Texto Refundido de la Ley General de la Seguridad Social 
(BOE de 29 de junio). 
 
Social Security 
1995 Legislative Decree No. 1/1995, March 24, Workers’ Statute.  
Real Decreto Legislativo 1/1995, de 24 de marzo, por el que se 
aprueba el Texto Refundido del Estatuto de los Trabajadores (BOE de 
29 de marzo). 
 
Communication Report of the analysis of the structural problems of 
the system of the Social Security and the main reforms that will have 
to be undertaken (Toledo Pact) (approved by the Congress, 6th of 
April). 
Informe de la Ponencia para el análisis de los problemas estructurales 
del sistema de la Seguridad Social y de las principales reformas que 
deberán acometerse (Pacto de Toledo) (aprobado el por el pleno del 
Congreso de los Diputados 6 de abril). 
 
Labour Market 
 
 
 
 
 
Social Security 
Reform 
 
 
 
1996 Agreement for the Consolidation and Rationalization of the Social 
Security System (signed by the Government and the trade unions: 
Comisiones Obreras and UGT, 9th of October). 
Acuerdo para la consolidación y racionalización del sistema de la 
seguridad social (firmado por el Gobierno y los sindicatos Comisiones 
Obreras y UGT el 9 de octubre). 
 
Social Security 
Reform 
1997 Law No. 24/1997, July 15, on Consolidation and Rationalization of the 
Social Security System. 
Ley 24/1997, de 15 de julio, de Consolidación y Racionalización del 
Sistema de la Seguridad Social (BOE de 16 de julio). 
 
Decree No. 5/1997, January 10, on Unemployment subsidy for 
eventual employees registered in the Special Agrarian Regime of the 
Social Security. 
Real Decreto 5/1997, de 10 de enero, por el que se regula el subsidio 
por desempleo a favor de los trabajadores eventuales incluidos en el 
Régimen Especial Agrario de la Seguridad Social. (BOE de 11 de 
enero). 
 
Decree No. 140/1997, January 31, modifying to some extent the basic 
organic structure of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and 
converting the National Institute of Social Services into the Institute of 
Migrations and Social Services. 
Real Decreto 140/1997, de 31 de enero, por el que se modifica 
parcialmente la estructura orgánica básica del Ministerio de Trabajo y 
Asuntos Sociales y transforma el Instituto Nacional de Servicios 
Sociales en Instituto de Migraciones y Servicios Sociales (BOE de 6 
de febrero). 
Social Security 
Reform 
 
 
 
Agrarian 
Unemployment 
Subsidy 
 
 
 
 
 
Social Services 
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Decree No. 1647/1997, October 31, implementing some aspects of 
the Law No. 24/1997, July 25, on Consolidation and Rationalization of 
the System of the Social Security. 
Real Decreto 1647/1997, de 31 de octubre, por el que se desarrollan 
determinados aspectos de la Ley 24/1997, de 15 de julio, de 
consolidación y racionalización del sistema de la seguridad social 
(BOE de 13 de noviembre). 
 
 
 
 
 
Social Security 
Reform 
1999 Law No. 3971999, November 5, Family and Labour Life Conciliation 
Law. 
Ley 39/1999, de 5 de noviembre, para promover la conciliación de la 
vida familiar y laboral de las personas trabajadoras (BOE de 6 de 
noviembre). 
 
Family Policy 
2000 Decree-Law No. 1/2000, January 14, on measures to improve family 
protection of the Social Security. 
Real Decreto-Ley 1/2000, de 14 de enero, sobre determinadas 
medidas de mejora de la protección familiar de la Seguridad Social 
(BOE de 17 de enero). 
 
Decree-Law No. 1368/2000, July 19, on the development of the 
Economic Benefits of single payment for the 3rd child birth and 
successive and multiple birth. 
Real Decreto-Ley 1368/2000, de 19 de julio, de desarrollo de las 
prestaciones económicas de pago único por nacimiento de tercer o 
sucesivos hijos y por parto múltiple (BOE de 29 de julio). 
 
Decree No. 236/2000, February 18, Insertion Programme for year 
2000, for long-term unemployed people, older than 45 years (Active 
Income for Insertion) (extended yearly). 
Real Decreto 236/2000, de 18 de febrero, por el que se regula un 
programa, para el año 2000, de inserción laboral para trabajadores 
desempleados de larga duración en situación de necesidad, mayores 
de 45 años. (Renta Activa de Inserción) (prorrogado anualmente) 
(BOE de 10 de marzo).  
 
Decree No. 73/2000, January 21, modifying section 4 of article 3 of 
Decree No. 5/1997, January 10 on Unemployment subsidy for 
eventual employees registered in the Special Agrarian Regime of the 
Social Security, and extending its provisional orders. 
Real Decreto 73/2000, de 21 de enero, por el que se modifica el 
apartado 4 del artículo 3 del Real Decreto 5/1997, de 10 de enero, por 
el que se regula el subsidio por desempleo a favor de los trabajadores 
eventuales incluidos en el Régimen Especial Agrario de la Seguridad 
Social y se prorroga la vigencia de sus disposiciones transitorias 
(BOE de 22 de enero).  
 
Non-contributory 
Family Protection 
 
 
 
 
Non-contributory 
Family Protection 
 
 
 
 
 
Active Income for 
Insertion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Agrarian 
Unemployment 
Subsidy 
2001 Agreement for the improvement and development of the social 
protection system (signed by the Government, the employers’ 
association (CEOE and CEPYME) and Comisiones Obreras, 9th of 
April). 
Acuerdo para la mejora y el desarrollo del sistema de protección 
social (firmado por el Gobierno, la Patronal (CEOE y CEPYME) y 
Comisiones Obreras el 9 de abril). 
 
National Action Plan on Social Inclusion (june 2001-june 2003) 
(approved by the Ministers Council). 
Plan Nacional de Acción para la Inclusión Social del Reino de España 
(junio 2001-junio 2003) (aprobado por el Consejo de Ministros el 29 
de mayo). 
Social Security 
Reform 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Spanish NAPSI 
(NAP/inc)  
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Appendix II: Summary of indicators to monitor the Spanish NAPSI 
(NAP/incl.) 
 
Area Indicators (a) 
Access to employment * Number of unemployed with 1 year or longer out of work 
* Number of long-term unemployed>45 and level of formal education 
lower than secondary 
* Number of long-term unemployed<25 and level of formal education 
no higher than secondary 
* Sub-employed workers 
* Expenditure made 
Primary social services  * Number of citizens in situation of need 
* Number of gypsies without regular employment 
* Number of illiterate older than 16 years 
* Number of youngsters between 6-15 without out of school 
* Expenditure made 
Income guaranteed * Number of citizens below the 60% of the median 
* Number of citizens below the 15% of average disposable income 
* Number of households in dire straits 
* Number of beneficiaries 
* Expenditure made 
Access to housing * Number of new built houses 
* Number of houses with rental subvention 
* Number of houses without minimum conditions 
* Number of houses in very bad conditions 
* Number of shanty houses 
* Expenditure made 
Access to education * Number of unemployed illiterate of 16 years 
* Number of children and youngsters of 6-15 years out of school 
* Number of youngsters in courses lower than their corresponding 
level of education 
* Number of youngsters without working experience and without formal 
education lower than secondary level 
* Expenditure made 
Access to health * Number of disabled citizens 
* Number with limited personal autonomy (long-term care) 
* Number of citizens with AIDS disease 
* Number of disabled <65 years 
* Number of disabled >65 years 
* Expenditure made 
Access to new 
technologies 
* Number of schools with access to Internet 
* Number of youngsters in courses lower than their corresponding 
level of education 
* Expenditure made 
Policies for family 
solidarity 
* Number of citizens eligible for these actions 
* Number of citizens living on their own 
* Number of unemployed single-parent families with dependent 
children 
* Expenditure made 
Programmes for the 
poor 
* Number of poor below the 60% mean 
* Number of poor below the 15% of the average disposable income 
* Number of disabled and citizens with severe restrictions of personal 
autonomy (long-term care) 
* Expenditure made 
Programmes for the 
gypsy population 
* Number of excluded gypsy citizens 
* Number of gypsy citizens with no regular employment 
* Expenditure 
Programmes for the 
immigrants 
* Number of immigrants in the process of legal regularisation 
* Expenditure made 
Disabled citizens * Number of poor with disability 
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* Number of poor households 
* Number of citizens with a high degree of disability or with  severe 
restrictions of personal autonomy (long-term care) 
* Expenditure made 
Public information * Number of interventions 
* Number of poor households 
* Expenditure made 
Participation of social 
partners in the 
development of social 
capital 
* Number of jobs in NGOs (associations and foundations) 
* Number of voluntary workers registered in NGOs 
* Expenditure made 
Communication 
interventions 
* Number of targeted people 
* Expenditure made 
Establishment of co-
ordinating institutions 
1. Number of public bodies involved 
2. Number of roundtables under this theme 
3. Number of involved beneficiary associations 
4. Number of collaborating NGOs 
5. Number of participating social partners 
5.1. Number of business organisations 
5.2. Number of trade unions 
6. Number of direct voluntary participants or working in NGOs 
7. Number of participants in seminars or Master courses on Social 
Inclusion 
8. Training courses developed 
8.1. Number of participants in training courses 
8.2. Number of agreements with collaborating institutions 
8.3. Number of participants from governmental bodies 
9. Public campaigns 
9.1. Number of conferences and meetings 
10. Number of reported best practices 
* Expenditure made 
(a) In all monitoring indicators the variable of gender should be taken into account whenever 
possible 
 
Source: MTAS, 2001a:  49-51 
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Appendix III: Regional Legislation on Minimum Income Programmes 
 
 
 
Andalusia 
 
 
 
Decree. No. 400/1990, September 27, on the creation of the Andalusian Solidarity
Programme for eradicating exclusion and inequality. 
Decreto 400/1990, de 27 de noviembre. Creación del Programa de Solidaridad de
los Andaluces para la erradicación de la marginación y la desigualdad (BOJA núm.
99, 30 de noviembre). 
 
Decree No. 113/1998, June 2, on creation of the Committee for reforming of Decree
No. 400/1990, November 27. 
Decreto 113/1998, de 2 de junio. Creación de la Comisión para la reforma del
Decreto 400/1990, de 27 de noviembre (BOJA núm. 66, 16 de junio). 
 
Decree No. 284/1998, December 29, on economic aid supplements (extra) for 
retired pensioners and disabled pensioners, (non-contributory access). 
Decreto 284/1998, de 29 de diciembre, por el que se establecen ayudas 
económicas complementarias de carácter extraordinario a favor de los 
pensionistas por jubilación e invalidez, en sus modalidades no contributivas (BOJA 
núm. 149, 31 de diciembre de 1998). 
 
Decree No. 2/1999, January 12, on the regulation of the creation of the Andalusian
Solidarity Programme for eradicating exclusion and inequality. 
Decreto 2/1999, de 12 de enero, por el que se regula la creación del Programa de 
Solidaridad de los andaluces para la erradicación de la marginación y la 
desigualdad (BOJA núm. 16, 6 de febrero). 
 
Aragon Law No. 1/1993, February 19, Basic Measures of Insertion and Social 
Normalization. 
Ley 1/1993, de 19 de febrero. Medidas Básicas de Inserción y Normalización 
Social (BOA núm. 24, 1 de marzo). 
 
Decree No. 57/1994, March 23, on the regulation of the Aragonese Insertion 
Income, developing of Law 1/1993. 
Decreto 57/1994, de 23 de marzo. Regulación del Ingreso Aragonés de Inserción 
de desarrollo de la Ley 1/1993 (BOA núm. 43, 8 de abril). 
 
Asturias Decree No. 28/1990, March 8, on Aids for Situations of Extreme Poverty. 
Decreto 28/1990, de 8 de marzo. Ayudas para Situaciones de Extrema Necesidad 
(ASEN). 
 
Law No. 6/1991, April 5, on the regulation of the Minimum Insertion Income. 
Ley 6/1991, de 5 de abril. Regulación del Ingreso Mínimo de Inserción (BOPA 
núm. 87, 17 de abril). 
 
Decree No. 158/1991, December 2. Minimum Insertion Income rules. 
Decreto 158/1991, de 2 de diciembre. Reglamento del Ingreso Mínimo de 
Inserción (BOPA núm. 294, 21 de diciembre). 
 
Pact for regulating the working conditions stemmed from Minimum Insertion 
Income start-up. Trade unions: DRAS, UGT. CCOO. 22nd of January. 
Pacto por el que se regulan las condiciones laborales y profesionales derivadas de 
la aplicación del Ingreso Mínimo de Inserción en la Comunidad del Principado de 
Asturias. DRAS, UGT. CCOO, 22 de enero de 1993. 
 
General Insertion Plan, year 1993. 
Plan general de inserción año 1993. 
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Balearics Decree No. 36/1995, April 6, on the regulation of the Community Provisional 
Support.- Mallorca Council modifies the Community Provisional Support rules the 
17th of June. 
Decreto 36/1995, de 6 de abril. Regulación del Soporte Transitorio Comunitario 
(BOIB núm. 19, 20 de abril) – Modificación de las bases reguladoras del Soporte 
Transitorio Comunitario. Consejo Insular de Mallorca (BOIB núm. 74, 17 de junio). 
Basque Country Decree No. 39/1989, February 28. Minimum Family Income. 
Decreto 39/1989, de 28 de febrero. Ingreso Mínimo Familiar (BOPV núm. 44, 6 de 
marzo). 
  
Decree No. 64/1989, March 21, on Economic Aid for Situations of Extreme 
Poverty. 
Decreto 64/1989, de 21 de marzo. Ayudas Económicas a Situaciones de 
Emergencia Social. (BOPV núm. 60, 30 de marzo). 
  
Law No. 2/1990, May 3, Minimum Insertion Income. 
Ley 2/1990, de 3 de mayo. Ingreso Mínimo de Inserción. (BOPV núm. 106, 30 de 
mayo). 
  
Decree No. 193/1990, July 17, on the Minimum Insertion Income rules. 
Decreto 193/1990, de 17 de julio. Reglamento de Aplicación del Ingreso Mínimo de 
Inserción (BOPV núm. 166, 20 de agosto). 
 
Decree No. 26/1993, February 9. Economic Aid for Situations of Extreme Poverty. 
Decreto 26/1993, de 9 de febrero, por el que se establecen las Ayudas 
Económicas a Situaciones de Emergencia Social. (BOPV núm. 38, 25 de febrero). 
 
Law No. 12/1998, May 22. Law Against Social Exclusion. 
Ley 12/1998, de 22 de mayo. Contra la Exclusión Social (BOPV núm. 105, 8 de 
junio). 
 
Decree No. 198/1999 and Decree No. 199/1999, April 20, on Special Need Aids. 
Decreto 198/1999 y Decreto 199/1999, de 20 de abril. Ayudas de Emergencia 
Social (BOPV núm. 94, 20 de mayo). 
 
Law No. 8/2000 and Law No. 9/2000, November 10, modifying the Law Against 
Social Exclusion. 
Ley 8/2000 y Ley 9/2000, de 10 de noviembre. Modificación de la Ley Contra la 
Exclusión Social. (BOPV núm. 1, 2 de enero). 
 
Law 10/2000, December 27. Social Rights Letter. 
Ley 10/2000, de 27 de diciembre. Carta de Derechos Sociales. (BOPV núm. 249, 
30 de diciembre). 
 
Decree No. 1/2000, January 11, on the regulation of the Insertion Agreements. 
Decreto 1/2000, de 11 de enero, por el que se regulan los Convenios de Inserción 
(BOPV núm. 20, 31 de enero). 
 
Decree No. 182/2000, September 19, Programme AUZOLAN for the occupational 
insertion of people in at-risk situations or in exclusion. 
Decreto 182/2000, de 19 de septiembre, por el que se articula el programa 
AUZOLAN, para la Inserción Laboral de las personas en situación de riesgo o 
exclusión (BOPV núm. 218, 14 de noviembre).  
 
Order 14-02-2001 from the Councillor of Justice, Work and Social Security, 
establishing employment incentives for Basic Income and Special Need Aids 
beneficiaries. It abolished the Order 3-02-2000 that introduced the model. 
Orden de 14-02-2001, del Consejero de Justicia, Trabajo y Seguridad Social, por 
la que se establecen los estímulos al empleo de los titulares de la Renta Básica y 
de los beneficiarios de las Ayudas de Emergencia Social. Deroga la orden 3-02-
2000, que implanta inicialmente el modelo (BOPV núm. 37, 21 de febrero). 
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Canaries Decree No. 79/1991, April 16. on Urgent Measures for Social Inclusion (PER: 
Regulated Cash Benefits, Access Programme, Integration Programme).  
Decreto 79/1991, de 16 de abril. Medidas Urgentes de Inserción Social (PER: 
Prestaciones Económicas Regladas, Programa de Accesibilidad y Programa de 
Integración) (BOC núm. 60, 8 de mayo). 
 
Decree No. 133/1992, July 30. Basic Economic Aids. 
Decreto 133/1992, de 30 de julio. Ayudas Económicas Básicas (BOC núm. 125, 4 
de septiembre). 
 
Decree No. 13/1998, February 5, on the regulation of the Basic Economic Aids. 
Decreto 13/1998, de 5 de febrero. Regulación de las Ayudas Económicas Básicas 
(BOC núm. 27, 2 de marzo). 
 
Report No. 1/1998. Social Integration Plan against poverty and social exclusion in 
Canaries. (Approved in the plenary session of the Council the 19th of March). 
Dictamen 1/1998, Plan de Integración Social contra la pobreza y la exclusión social 
en Canarias. (Aprobado en sesión del Pleno del Consejo de fecha 19 de marzo de 
1998). 
 
Cantabria 
 
Decree No. 40/1989, May 17. Cantabrian Plan for Family Assistance: Minimum 
Family Income. 
Decreto 40/1989, de 17 de mayo. Plan Cántabro de Ayuda a la Necesidad 
Familiar: Ingreso Mínimo Familiar  
 
Decree No. 75/1995, March 23. Cantabrian Plan of Minimum Insertion Income. 
Decreto 75/1996, de 7 de agosto. Plan Cántabro de Ingresos Mínimos de Inserción 
(IMI) (BOC núm. 164, 15 de agosto). 
 
Castille-La Mancha Decree No. 141/1990, December 18. Regional Solidarity Plan: Additional Aid, 
Ordinary Aid and Insertion Aid. 
Decreto 141/1990, de 18 de diciembre. Plan Regional de Solidaridad: Ayuda 
Extraordinaria, Ayuda Ordinaria, Ayuda de Inserción (DOCM núm. 95, 26 de 
diciembre). 
 
Law 5/1995, March 23. Solidarity Plan in Castille-La Mancha. 
Ley 5/1995, de 23 de marzo. Plan de Solidaridad en Castilla-La Mancha (DOCM 
núm. 29, 19 de abril). 
 
Decree No. 143/1996, December 17, on the regulation of the Solidarity Minimun 
Income and of the Special Need Aids. 
Decreto 143/1996, de 17 de diciembre. Regulación del Ingreso Mínimo de 
Solidaridad y de las Ayudas de Emergencia Social (DOCM núm. 57, 20 de 
diciembre). 
 
Decree No. 144/1996, December 17, on the development of the Programme for 
Personal Support and Individual Attention, of the Programme for Insertion and of 
the Collaboration and Cooperation on Social Services. 
Decreto 144/1996, de 17 de diciembre, del desarrollo del Programa de Apoyo 
Personal y Atención Individualizada, del Programa de Inserción y de la 
Colaboración y Cooperación en Materia de Servicios Sociales (DOCM núm. 57, 20 
de diciembre).  
 
Decree No. 12/2002, January 15, modifying Decree No. 143/1996, December 17, 
on the development of the Solidarity Minimum Income and of the Special Need 
Aids. 
Decreto 12/2002, de 15 de enero, por el que se modifica el decreto 143/1996, de 
17 de diciembre, de desarrollo del ingreso mínimo de solidaridad y de las ayudas 
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